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ON THE
EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL
AFTER DEATH.
A
DISSERTATION.

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ON THE
EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL
AFTER DEATH:

A
DISSERTATION

OPPOSED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PRIESTLEY, LAW,
AND THEIR RESPECTIVE FOLLOWERS.

By R. C.

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ON THE

EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

AFTER DEATH.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction—Indestructibility of matter—Instances—Resolvable by decomposition into its component parts, which are neither visible nor tangible—Peculiar properties of spirit distinct from those of matter—Probability that spirit is indestructible as well as matter—Essence of both alike unknown—Transformations of insects indicate a change, but not an annihilation, of their existence—Argument from thence.

UPON what more interesting topic can the human mind be exercised, than upon that, which relates to the probability or improbability, the certainty or uncertainty, of its own existence hereafter? When we trace the finger of God in every thing above, beneath, and around us; when we feel ourselves not only endowed with the faculty of contemplating present, of anticipating future, and of reflecting upon past, impressions, but capable also of reasoning upon every thing which passes within and exists without us; it seems natural to inquire,

whether thought and consciousness will be annihilated by death, and creation become to us one universal blank ; or whether the mind will survive the dissolution of the body.

But what is this corporeal substance, the existence of which is demonstrable by sense ? With its *peculiar properties* we are well acquainted ; but what do we know of its *essence* ? Absolutely nothing. We are sufficiently conversant with its capacity for the assumption of new forms, and with its aptitude to enter into new combinations ; its sensible qualities are perfectly familiar to us ; but beyond this, all is complete ignorance.

If matter then, when we are desirous of seizing and investigating its essential nature, thus, like another Proteus, constantly eludes our grasp, what rational hope can we entertain of ever discovering the essence of mind ? Whether mind be, or be not, a superaddition to matter, instead of being a substance in nature altogether distinct from it, we are certain, that mind possesses properties, which matter by itself does not possess. The latter can neither think nor reason ; neither is it capable of sensation, when unconnected with the former. How then can mind be characterized as a mere modification of matter, with the slightest degree of propriety, when it confessedly is capable of ener-

gies and operations, of which matter is utterly incapable? And as they are distinguished from each other by qualities of a very different description, ought we not to contemplate them as two distinct substances, dissimilar in nature, but united by the mighty hand of God into one compound being, producing a mutual combination of cause and effect? God we believe to be a Spirit, wholly unclothed with matter; is it not reasonable therefore to conclude, that he has communicated to his creatures a portion of his own spiritual nature—of that which is capable of existing in union with body, and likewise of existing alone in a separate state, as God himself exists, unconnected with body? That spirit, mind, or call it what we will, requires not a conjunction with matter to call forth its powers, and display its peculiar energies, is demonstrable from the existence of Him, who pervades nature, and fills creation, exempt from all material mixture or combination. And can we think that He, who made us, whose mercy is over all his works, would shake out a living spark from the unquenchable flame of intellect, and after having confined it for a short time in a mass of corruptible flesh, release and extinguish it for ever?

But why do some writers maintain, that the

thinking part of our nature perishes with the perishable body? Is it because spirit, or the principle of life, is neither visible nor tangible, that they doubt the continuation of its existence? Yet do they fully believe in the existence of many things, which neither the eye can see nor the finger touch. Take oxygen gas as a familiar instance. It is known to constitute a considerable portion of the air which we breathe; and without it, neither life nor flame can be long supported. Yet is it neither visible nor tangible; nor is it distinguishable by the sight from the other gas, with which it is combined in the air of our atmosphere. Its existence, however, is indisputable. And although it be incapable of being either seen or handled, its presence may be said to be universal, and its combinations almost infinite. Thus, if metallic lead, for example, be surrounded with a lambent flame in perpetual contact with a supply of atmospherical air, the oxygen of the air combines with it, and converts it into a red powder, known in commerce by the name of red lead, or minium. Again, if the same red powder be exposed in a *closed* vessel to a strong heat, the oxygen is expelled, and may be obtained, as gas, in a separate uncombined state. But neither in its combined nor uncombined state, is it discernible by the eye, or discoverable by the

touch. *Visibility* and *tangibility*, therefore, are not the necessary criteria of even material, much less of spiritual, existence.

We are accustomed to contemplate man as an object of sight, and to convince ourselves of his actual presence, by feeling resistance from the solidity of his external form; yet we ought not hence to conclude, that he is a simple, and not a compounded, being. When we examine with our eyes the transformed lead already alluded to, and test its solidity by the touch; we do not suppose it to be a simple, because we know it to be a compounded, substance. The same is the case with innumerable, indeed, almost all, substances in nature. He who takes up a common limestone, and surveys it accurately, would naturally, if unaided by chemical science, pronounce it to be an uncompounded substance: and this indeed was the universal opinion, until Philosophy advanced from sound to sense, and from the chaos of metaphysical obscurity into the clearer light of experimental truth. But if the limestone be exposed to a strong heat, and its component parts dissevered, we obtain from it two very different substances—carbonic acid gas and a fixed residue of lime; its adhesive structure being destroyed, not, as in the former instance, by the accession of a new prin-

ciple, but by the loss of an old one. Heat decomposes the limestone ; death, assisted by natural solvents, decomposes the human body ; and both subsequently lose their adhesive properties : the former from the loss of its aerial acid, the latter from the loss of its vital principle, by whatsoever denomination, whether by that of spirit or of matter, we may choose to characterize that principle. But, because carbonic acid gas is not an object either of the sight, or of the touch, do we therefore disbelieve the fact of its existence, not indeed in a solid, but in an aerial state ? So likewise, because the spirit is not an object either of the sight, or of the touch, ought we *on that account* to deny the reality of its separate existence ? Whether both do or do not continue in existence, after the decomposition of the substances with which they are severally combined, must depend, it is true, upon other proofs ; but their deficiency in the points to which I have alluded, must not be urged as any demonstration of their non-existence.

But omitting at present to inquire what may become of the spirit hereafter, are we sure, that even the less substantial parts of our body are annihilated by death ? Here again science steps in, and tells us, that they are not ; that they are decomposed indeed by death, but not annihilated.

They lose their solidity and union of parts ; but they still exist in an aerial state ; in a state, in which they are neither visible nor tangible, passing into that immense ocean of atmosphere, with which we are constantly surrounded—not that they are there found as an aggregate mass of combined and homogeneous gases, peculiarly attractive of each other ; but as an efflux of uncombined and heterogeneous gases, uniting and re-uniting with other substances, solid, fluid, and aerial, which constitute distinct and unconnected compounds, and thus assisting to produce a perpetual succession of transformations, as well as to supply the never-ceasing wants of the universe. Absolute destruction is unknown in nature. Solids become fluids, and fluids become airs, without any annihilation of their component parts ; or solids become airs at once without passing through the intermediate stage of fluidity. Again, airs become fluids, and fluids solids ; or airs at once become solids, without any intervening transformation. Sometimes, it is true, airs constitute with solids, already formed, a new compound, but this is not always the case ; for they are themselves capable of combining with each other, and of becoming visible and tangible, by being converted both into fluids and solids, without the foreign admixture of any

more substantial principle. A common instance of the change of airs into fluids and solids occurs in the transformation of water ¹.

Neither is it necessary, as I have remarked, that an aerial compound should pass through the fluid state, before it becomes solid, as in the case of water. Ammonia is a compound of nitrogen and hydrogen, gases abundantly supplied by all animal decomposition; the compound may be confined over quicksilver in the invisible state of air.

¹ The simple abstraction of heat converts water, we know, from a fluid into a solid state, when it is frozen into ice; by the reassumption of its lost heat, it a second time becomes fluid; and again, by the addition of more heat it evaporates, and is converted into air. Nor is this all—the chemist assures us, that water is by no means a simple element, but a compound, formed by two distinct airs or gases in mutual combination; that it is nothing more than a composition of hydrogen and oxygen. This fact is indisputably demonstrated by the application of galvanism. When water is galvanized, it instantly is decomposed, and bubbles arise from it abundantly, which, being collected in proper vessels, and examined, appear to consist wholly of hydrogen and oxygen gases. This is its decomposition. But further, if these very gases so obtained be submitted to another experiment, and the electric or galvanic spark be passed through them, the space, which they occupied, disappears; and when they are confined over quicksilver, water is again formed upon the surface of the metal. This is its recomposition; an effect, which human art alone can produce and reproduce at pleasure.

If to this *invisible* compound, muriatic acid gas alike invisible, be added, a *visible and solid salt* is almost immediately formed, which is found to be muriate of ammonia, that is common sal ammoniac.

Since, therefore, the least solid parts of the human body, those which are deemed the most destructible, are really *indestructible*, being only decomposed, but not annihilated, and being resolved into the same invisible airs, from which they were originally formed ; can we conceive, that the principle within us, which thinks, reasons, and is made capable of participating in the bounties of creation, that which we emphatically term *ourselves*, is the only destructible thing about us ; that its invisibility affords any satisfactory proof of its non-entity ? When we see that the subtle principles of which the body is composed, escape by its dissolution from their corporeal confinement, and ascend into the atmosphere ; can we be persuaded, that the still more subtle principle of mind does not escape from the corruptible mass, in which it has been here imprisoned, and assume a new state of uncombined existence. The peculiar properties of the subtle principles which compose the body, are not discoverable in the aggregated compound ; but they instantly display themselves,

when they are extricated from it. Ought we not therefore hence to conclude by analogy, that the soul itself, when it is extricated from the gross material body with which it is at present united, will disclose properties, and develop powers, of which in this life it gives no indication? A spiritual substance, indeed, cannot, perhaps, in all respects, be assimilated to a material one, especially in the point of divisibility; but thus far, I apprehend, we may safely argue, that every substance whatsoever, which, after having been circumscribed in its powers by junction with another substance, escapes from that junction, will be capable of exerting its native energies, and exhibiting its peculiar qualities, with greater freedom and effect, than it was before enabled to do.

Much confusion, however, has arisen in the discussion of this subject, by the use of the words *material* and *immaterial*. Of a *material* substance, it has been supposed, that we have a perfectly clear conception, but that of an *immaterial* substance we have no conception whatsoever. The fact, however, seems to be, that we have as distinct a conception of the one as of the other. Respecting the nature of a *material* substance, we know nothing, as I have already remarked, except from such information as we are able to col-

lect from our observations of certain qualities in it, cognizable by our senses ; and we know just as much respecting the nature of an *immaterial* substance, or perhaps more properly of a *spiritual* substance, from a consideration of certain qualities in it, cognizable by our intellect. A *spiritual* substance, therefore, is by no means the *mere negative* of a *material* one. It has properties of its own, very different from those of the other, which sufficiently distinguish and characterize it. That there are modifications indeed of spirit, as well as of matter, the diversified mental operations of animals sufficiently evince ; but what the essence, or substratum, really is, either of matter or of spirit, which is thus capable of modification, it seems in vain to inquire. And yet there are theorists, who contend for the materiality of spirit, and conceive it to be a point of easy and familiar proof ; ascribing to one and the same principle properties of very opposite descriptions, which, as appears, if not from the test of sense, at least from every deduction of reason, must evidently belong to two.

That spirit may exist devoid of all matter, is a fact which cannot be controverted ; or otherwise, God himself, a spirit without body, parts, or passions, could not be present, as he must be, in his character of Creator and Preserver, at all times,

and in all places. Experience, it is true, does not prove to us, that man, or rather the soul of man, is capable of existing unconnected with an organized body. The supposition, however, conveys neither absurdity nor contradiction ; but seems the natural result of an inquiry into the nature of God, as manifested to us in the visible works of creation. In the present life, we know that the soul exerts its energies through the instrumentality of corporeal organs ; but this is no proof, that in another state it cannot exist as a spiritual substance, and exert its energies without them, or at least, through the instrumentality of organs very different from those which it now possesses. To say that we do not perceive any evidence of such an existence, and display of powers, is only to say that we do not see that which is invisible. What may be the substance of spirit, or whether it may or may not hereafter combine, and be clothed, with another substance, of which at present we can form no conception, it is useless to conjecture : and perhaps, after all, every speculation upon the materiality of the soul can only serve to betray our consummate ignorance ; and a second time to amuse and perplex the world with the mad metaphysics of those schoolmen, who argued, that spirits were, formed of matter, but of matter so subtle

and refined, that millions of them might dance, booted and spurred, upon a needle's point ¹.

The transformations of visible nature, which pass before our eyes, and which we can completely investigate, seem calculated to excite our admiration, and to puzzle our intellect. Innumerable winged insects, which we behold, many of the countless millions which swarm around us, we know to have been first worms crawling on the earth, afterwards apparently lifeless unshapen masses, and at last exalted tenants of the air, ever active, sportive, and happy. In their first degraded state, their enjoyment of being appears much inferior to that which they afterwards experience, when from the fine-spun tomb, in which they had previously encased themselves, they spring forth new creatures into life, light, and joy. I know not how I can better express myself on this subject, than in the words of a short poetical quotation, which is given in "Time's Telescope" for the year 1820, page 146.

" Child of the sun ! pursue thy rapturous flight,
Roving with her thou lov'st, in fields of light ;
And, where the flowers of Paradise unfold,
Quaff fragrant nectar from their cups of gold ;

¹ More's Divine Dialogues, vol. i. pp. 90, 91.

There shall thy wings, rich as an evening sky,
 Expand and shut in silent ecstasy.
 Yet wert thou once a worm, a thing that crept
 On the bare earth, then wrought a tomb, and slept."

Nor can I deduce a more appropriate inference from the fact, to which allusion is here made, than that which is contained in the concluding lines of the same quotation, making some allowance for a little poetical embellishment.

" And such is man, soon from his cell of clay
 To burst a seraph in the blaze of day."

On the whole, therefore, as nothing in the material world is annihilated, but simply by decomposition resolved into its component parts, and from a solid or fluid state becomes partly or wholly aerial ; and as numerous tribes of insects, under our own observation, deposit at certain periods their exhausted state of being, and assume a new one, the propensities only, not the essence, of their vital principle being changed ; can we possibly persuade ourselves that matter indeed survives the apparent wreck of nature, but that mind perishes ; and that many a poor worm, which we tread upon, is permitted to enjoy a second and superior state of existence, but that man, when once consigned to the grave, is

altogether blotted out of creation? Can we possibly persuade ourselves, that he, who is endowed with reason as well as life, with faculties capable of an endless progression in knowledge, once crushed beneath the heavy arm of death, is crushed to rise no more? That he, who alone of all creatures upon earth anticipates futurity, looks with anxiety beyond the confines of the tomb, and contemplates the countless ages of eternity,—who enjoys here the prospect of existing hereafter—a prospect not surely displayed to him only to mock his hopes, and deride his expectations,—is, when arrived at the moment of realizing that very prospect, abandoned by his all-gracious Creator, and lost for ever? Can this be the end of his being? this the termination of a life, spent perhaps, not merely in negative wants, but also in positive trouble, pain, and sorrow? Is man born with capacities so extensive, for enjoyments so limited? Every other creature has faculties solely adapted to the attainment of present gratification, and when that is attained, rests satisfied: but man, always indeed in pursuit, is never in possession, of permanent happiness; he has no sooner obtained the object of one wish, than he is engaged in a fresh pursuit; something unobtained still glitters in his eye, animates his hopes, and

stimulates his exertions. And can we think, that he, who thus experiences nothing in this world but a perpetual succession of disappointments, who is doomed to persevere in a fruitless chase, and never appears to answer the purposes of his creation, is born for this world only? that he must for ever lie extinguished in the dust, and be as if he had never been? Reason suggests that this cannot be; that God is wise as well as merciful; that he has made nothing in vain:—and what reason suggests, revelation happily confirms.

CHAPTER II.

Priestley maintained that the Soul was material, and a mere property of the Brain.—His illustration.—Essential particles of Man said to be preserved.—The Soul extinguished, but not annihilated.—Another singular illustration.—Personal identity.—Articles of the Church, 1552.—Sleep of the Soul.—Bishop Law's hypothesis.—Critical remark on the word *κοιμαμαι*, used in Scripture.—The Soul sometimes deprived of its active faculties and consciousness of events by accidents and diseases.—Preservation of consciousness in a future state.—Lapse of time.—Our ideas of its lapse between Death and the Resurrection, prospectively and retrospectively.

ADMITTING, therefore, the indestructibility of matter, a conclusion deducible from scientific experiment, and not from abstract reasoning, ought we not thence to infer that spirit also is indestructible? But there have been Christian writers who have entertained singular opinions upon this subject. The late Dr. Priestley, among his other peculiarities, strenuously contended for the materiality of the soul. Denying the existence of two distinct natures in man, mind he considered as a mere property of matter, and represented the brain to be not the seat, but the source, of all those rational faculties which are usually attributed to an imma-

terial principle. Thought, with all its immense ramifications and multiplied energies, he conceived to be nothing more than an effect produced by certain *vibrations* of the nervous system connected with the brain, from which alone it originates. The powers of thinking, or more correctly, perhaps, the operations of intellect, he held to be extinguished by death, but not annihilated. The essential parts of man, or rather the essential parts of the brain, from which thought proceeds, he supposed to be never lost ; but those only which he termed adventitious and extraneous, to perish. But what is this imperishable essence of man, and where is it preserved ? His answer was, in a certain seed or germ, neither visible nor tangible, yet existing somewhere, in which the intellect and personal identity of the individual lies dormant and inactive, hereafter to spring forth again into life and operation.

This singular hypothesis, so unphilosophical in the basis on which it rests, as well as in the fanciful superstructure raised upon that basis, one would think, did we not know to the contrary, could never have taken root in a mind so philosophical as that of Priestley. But although acute, persevering, and fortunate in experiment, he was but a prejudiced, loose, and inaccurate reasoner upon the results of experiment. Thought then, accord-

ing to him, is nothing more than a mere property of the organized brain. We see the brain decomposed by death ; its substance, with all the properties inherent in it, disappears ; nor does the supposed property of thought form any exception, all vanishing together. What possible reason, therefore, have we to conjecture, that there still exists, we know not where, a certain nucleus, seed, germ, or call it what we will, which contains the essence of this indescribable property ? If it be not the object of our senses, what proof at all have we of its existence ? The component parts of the brain are, we know, resolvable by putrefaction into carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, like other animal substances. Will it be argued, that the principle in dispute may lie concealed and unobserved among these ? That cannot be, for the airs, which, when converted into a solid form, combine to constitute the brain, upon again assuming their elastic state, are dissipated in the atmosphere, and administer to the general wants of nature. And is it philosophical to assert that matter may nevertheless exist, or rather that a *peculiar property* of matter may exist, after the decomposition of the substance to which it belongs, although it be undiscoverable by our senses, and incapable in any way of being submitted to the test of experiment ?

To explain his meaning more fully, Priestley gave the following curious illustration of it. "The power of *cutting*, in a razor, depends upon a certain cohesion and arrangement of the parts of which it consists. If we suppose the razor to be wholly dissolved in any acid liquor, its power of cutting will certainly be *lost* or cease to be, though no particle of the metal that constituted the razor be annihilated by the process; and its former *shape* and *power of cutting*, &c. may be restored to it, after the metal has been precipitated. Thus when the body is dissolved by putrefaction, its power of thinking entirely ceases; but no particle of the man being *lost*, as many of them as are *essential* to him, will, I doubt not, be *collected* and *revivified* at the resurrection, when the power of thinking will return of course. I do not therefore think, that any thing that I have advanced implies that the *soul*, that is, *the man*, loses his *existence* at death, in any other sense than that the man loses his *power of thinking* ¹."

But this comparison, however, does not strictly hold. The razor is not decomposed at all, nor does it suffer any separation of its constituent parts, but assumes only a different appearance, and is

¹ Correspondence with Dr. Price, p. 82, 83.

deprived of its former powers, by the acquisition of a new principle. It acquires by the action of the solvent a portion of oxygen, which it did not previously possess ; and again by the abstraction of the same acquired oxygen, becomes what it was before, and is rendered capable of receiving its former shape and properties ; but this is not the case with man. His substance is wholly decomposed ; its component parts, including the brain, of which intellect is stated to be a mere property, being separated from each other, fly off, and are dissipated. There seems, therefore, no precise applicability in the illustration.

It is stated, that no particle of the man is lost, but that as many as are essential to him will be again collected and revived. But what proof is there of this ? What proof that the *essential* particles of man are dispersed over all the world, and that from the creation to the present period, intermingled with an infinite variety of other matter, and never combining with any, kept perfectly distinct and entire ? Instead of elucidating the theory advanced, such a conjectural explication of it seems only calculated to render obscurity still more obscure, and, in the old phraseology of the schools, to explain *ignotum per ignotius*.

But, further, in what possible manner can per-

sonal identity be preserved amidst all this confusion of the essential particles of man, scattered in every direction, so that he, whose essential particles will hereafter be collected and revived, shall know himself to be the same individual as he was in his former state of existence? That the particles of the man are to be *separated* from each other, appears evident from the circumstance stated of their being ultimately *collected*. Are we then to suppose, that personal identity resides in one of these particles, or is diffused over the whole of them? But Priestley imagined, that *the consciousness of personal identity* altogether ceases at death, and will remain extinct, until the resurrection, when it will again revive at the revival of the body. Nevertheless he hazarded no conjecture how this is to be effected, but satisfied himself with the hypothetical assumption, that *if* after the resurrection "we shall know one another again, and converse together as before, we shall be to all intents and purposes *the same persons*. Our *personal identity* will be sufficiently preserved¹."

Conceiving the soul, or rather the faculty of conscious thought, to be a mere property of the brain, he held, that upon the reorganization of the

¹ Disquisitions, p. 160.

body, the soul itself with all its former recognitions of identity, will revive. Not that he supposed the body to suffer a complete change by putrefaction, for he added; “ I doubt not but that *the same body*, that dies, shall rise again, not with every thing, which is *adventitious* and *extraneous* (as all that we receive by nutrition), but with the same *stamina*, or those particles that really belonged to the *germ* of the organical body. And there can be no proof, that these particles are ever properly destroyed or interchanged¹.”

The argument here advanced, if argument it can be called, seems to be simply this : it is possible, that after the apparent putrefaction and decomposition of the human body, certain *stamina* or a certain *germ may* remain, imperceptible to our eyes, in which the essential particles of the man *may* reside, and that therefore such stamina or such a germ *must* remain, particularly as there can be no proof of their being ever destroyed. Again, *if* after the resurrection we shall recognize one another, and converse together as before, consciousness of *personal identity* will necessarily revive with the intellect, and so we shall then be the same persons ! Surely reasoning of this in-

¹ Disquisitions, p. 161.

conclusive nature sufficiently refutes itself. Can we possibly suppose, that Almighty God, who first produced man by the sole energies of his own Divine will, requires to reproduce him, the preservation of the same essential particles of which he was originally composed? Or, that those indescribable, as well as invisible, particles, disarranged by death, should continue for centuries confined in a minute germ, hereafter to be miraculously expanded into their former state of life and intellect. The extravagance of this conception seems only to be equalled by that of the ingenious author who wrote the fictitious *Tales of the Genii*, where, in a combat between two of those aerial beings, one of them saves himself from destruction by snugly concealing his person, and closely packing up the particles of his essence, in the single pip of a pomegranate. And yet an attachment to peculiar opinions in theology¹, and a habit of

¹ "The consideration, that biases me as a Christian (viz. Unitarian Christian), exclusive of philosophical considerations, against the doctrine of a *separate soul* is, that it has been the foundation of what appears to me to be the very grossest corruptions of Christianity." Correspondence with Dr. Price, *Introd.* p. xvii. "My book was written to prove, that, whatever matter might be, *thinking* is the result of a modification of it, or that this faculty does not belong to an *invisible* substance different from the body, which I apprehend to have been the source of the

continually hunting after novelties, so strongly biased the mind of Priestley, that he considered even this whimsical hypothesis as not *unphilosophical*¹."

greatest corruptions of the system of revelation. Effectually to explode this notion, originally borrowed from heathenism, and thereby to discharge from Christianity many enormous errors that now disfigure it, and make it appear absurd in the present enlightened age of philosophy, appears to me to be rendering it the most important of all services." Ibid. p. 60.

¹ "This opinion was advanced by Dr. Watts, and no man can say that it is unphilosophical."—Disquisitions, p. 161. By this passage, one would suppose, that Dr. Watts was as decided a materialist as Dr. Priestley. But the fact was far otherwise : for Watts firmly believed in the separate existence of the soul, and wrote in confirmation of this very point, "An Essay towards a proof of *a separate state of the soul* between death and the resurrection." He never imagined, that the *soul* was inclosed in the *germ* of Priestley. Innumerable passages from this essay might be given in proof of what is here stated ; but I shall only quote one. "So far as I can judge," he remarked, "the soul of man in its own nature is nothing else but a conscious and active principle, *subsisting by itself*, made after the image of God, who is all conscious activity ; and it is still the same being, whether it be *united to an animal body* or separated from it. If the body die, *the soul still exists*, an active and conscious power, principle, or being ; and if it ceases to be conscious and active, I think it ceases to be ; for I have no conception of what remains." The World to come, &c. p. 346. It is evident, therefore, whatsoever Watts might have dreamt respecting an unconscious germ, which

the old disputants, who argued, that a knife, which first had a new handle, and then a new blade, put to it, was still the same identical knife as before. Were he now alive, he would probably smile at this parallel instance of subtilty; but, as he is dead, and his powers of smiling as well as of thinking, according to his peculiar system, are extinguished in the grave, we must be permitted to smile for him. But does his candle comparison prove what he intended it to prove, or rather does it not prove directly the reverse? A candle, when extinguished, loses its light; but what becomes of that light? We cannot surely be so absurd as to suppose (or as he terms it *only* to suppose) that it is *dispersed*, and that the *same identical* particles of light are again *collected*, when the candle is rekindled. The first particles of light, as a flame distinct from other flames, are altogether lost in air, or, in their proper character, annihilated. But the latter particles of light, which appear upon the rekindling of the candle, are evidently a *new* creation, extricated during the decomposition of *another* and *different* portion of the candle by the action of atmospheric air. Besides the *whole* substance of the candle is not decomposed by the extinction, but only that part of it from which the light is produced, and this part is not *recomposed* at all, and united with

' the light at the second kindling. Indeed, light is
 e the product only of the *decomposition*, and not of a
 f *recomposition*.

The question indeed of personal identity seems to be the great stumbling-block of his system. If consciousness with the powers of thinking cease at death, and the whole man becomes extinguished, it must require something more than the flimsy reasoning, which I have detailed, to convince us, that after a lapse of some hundreds, perhaps some thousands, of years, a second man will appear, similar in features, if you please, and in mental capacities to a former man deceased, and yet not be *another* but the *very same identical person*. Upon the supposition, that consciousness with the powers of thinking does *not* cease at death, and that the soul is *not* extinguished, the preservation of personal identity, as well before as after the resurrection of the body, is perfectly intelligible. But, if we admit the hypothesis of Priestley, the preservation of personal identity is utterly inconceivable ; and the arguments, by which it is attempted to prove it, so unsound and hollow, as to ring at every touch.

It has been frequently remarked, that bodily diseases and injuries of the brain sometimes overwhelm the faculties of the soul, and wrap them in

a temporary oblivion ; yet that after the removal of the obstructing causes, they often revive in all their pristine vigour. Hence it has been argued, that, as the soul (or, as Priestley supposed, the mental property of the brain,) may lose for a time its active powers, and passing through a state of insensibility, again recover them, so may it become dormant and insensible between death and the resurrection, after which it may again revive with all its former consciousness, faculties, and recollections. But there is one *very important* difference between the two cases. In the first there is no extinction of the vital powers. The body exists, although diseased ; and the mind exists, although, in consequence of the body being diseased, it is not in the complete enjoyment of its discursive faculties. But in the second case, the body altogether ceases to exist, is decomposed, and becomes extinct ; and the same also must be said of the soul, if it be a mere property of the brain, and wholly dependent upon it for existence. Surely, then, the distinction is sufficiently obvious between a *suspension* of active intellect during life, and its *utter extinction* by death, for extinguished it is supposed to be according to the theory of the materialist.

If, therefore, when the body dies, the soul, what-

soever its nature may be, dies with it, when another body is given us, (for to dream that the *essential* particles of our bodies are preserved from death to the resurrection, seems little better than an idle reverie,) must not also another soul accompany it? The same substance as that, of which we are at present composed, cannot enter into the composition of our new bodies, for "this corruptible must put on incorruption," consequently the same consciousness of personal identity and intellectual faculties which we now possess, cannot enter into the composition of our new souls. In what sense then can we be said to be the same persons? In whatsoever way therefore we may twist and retwist the reasoning advanced on the other side, and endeavour to place it on any thing like a solid basis, our efforts will be unavailing, and we must ultimately come to this conclusion, that, in the case supposed, he who rises again, will be a different and not the same, a new and not the former man. The Unitarian, with a sneer of contempt at those who think differently from him, perpetually contends, that no *two* things, whether *material* or *immaterial*, whether we do or do not fully comprehend the principles of their respective natures, can possibly be *one and the same* thing; how then can he consistently argue

that the soul which occupies the present body of a man will be *one and the same* soul after its complete extinction by death, with that which will hereafter occupy not his present body, but a new and incorruptible body at the day of judgment? That the restoration of consciousness, while life remains in us, should accompany the restoration of the soul to its mental activity, we readily understand; but how the restoration of consciousness can take place, after the vital principle has been extinguished by death, and with it the soul itself, is utterly inconceivable. Essences and quintessences are universally exploded from the philosophy of modern chemistry; and it is surely time to explode them from the philosophy of modern metaphysics. It is indeed true, that Almighty power can effect every thing, at least every thing which is *possible*; but to say that it can effect *impossibilities* involves a manifest absurdity, and a direct contradiction in terms.

Admitting, therefore, that the consciousness of personal identity, must, according to the scheme of the materialist, be lost in the grave, and that the man of the resurrection will be an absolutely new being, in what manner, we may ask, can rewards and punishments be then awarded to those, who, from their previous conduct, are neither

entitled to the one, nor have deserved the other ? Would it not be absurd to suppose, that one man will be rewarded for virtues performed, or be punished for crimes perpetrated, by another ? But, if we believe the soul to be preserved in existence after death until the resurrection, no difficulty will arise in accounting for the mode in which it retains its consciousness of personal identity ; preserved, not in an insensible germ of supposed entity, but in a sensible state of actual existence.

In the Articles of the Church of England, as first established in the year 1552, there was one upon the very point under consideration. It was this : “ They which say, that the souls of such as depart hence do *sleep*, being *without all sense, feeling, or perceiving*, until the day of judgment ; or affirm that the souls *die with the bodies*, and at the last day shall be raised up with the same, do utterly dissent from the right belief, declared to us in Holy Scripture.” The controversy, therefore, did not originate with Priestley ; but is at least as old as the Reformation. He only revived it, zealously embracing, and pertinaciously defending, the opinion censured in the latter part of the Article. Nor have there been wanting theorists in modern times, who have maintained the opinion alluded to in the former part of the Article, viz.

that the soul sleeps without sense or perception, although not annihilated between death and the resurrection. Dr. E. Law, formerly Bishop of Carlisle, published a treatise expressly in support of this position ; whose reasoning has been since adopted by other writers, and urged sometimes with hesitation and sometimes with confidence, but never with more ability than by the Bishop himself ¹.

¹ I mean among writers of more modern times ; for the early champions of Socinianism supported this and their other peculiar opinions with a refinement of reasoning, subtle, but illusory, which has never been since exceeded, or seldom perhaps, if ever, equalled. Socinus, the founder of the sect, gives the following comment upon Matthew x. 28. and Luke xx. 38. “De loco illo, cujus explicationem quaeris, ita statuo ; ibi *animæ* nomine, quemadmodum alibi sæpissime, *vitam* significari, *quæ* certè non occiditur, etiamsi *corpus ipsum* occiditur. *Vivere* enim adhuc apud Deum is dici et potest et debet, qui *aliquando* in vitam, eamque immortalem ab ipso omnino *revocabitur*.” Opera, vol. I. p. 454. Again : “*Vivunt* Deo Abrahamus, Isaacus, et Jacobus, siquidem *resurrecturi sunt*. Sin minus planè sunt mortui, quare, cum Deus se Deum illorum esse dicat, Deus autem non mortuorum sed viventium sit, *ut resurgant necesse est*. Ita fit ut eodem tempore, sed diversa tamen ratione, ipsi etiam Deo et *mortui sint et vivant*. Vivunt Deo, quatenus eis vitam æternam omnino constituit. Mortui sunt Deo, quatenus *nondum* eam vitam *illis dedit*.” Ib. p. 145. An ingenious mode of attempting to prove, that the soul may be said to survive the body, not only

I cannot, however, collect from any thing which I have read upon the subject, what precise idea

because the *soul* and the *life* are sometimes expressed by the same word, but because the life, although *in point of fact extinct*, yet still exists in the eye of God, who intends, at some future but distant period, to restore it! Take another specimen of Socinian talent from the works of Crellius: "*Totum illud tempus, inter ultimum vitæ nostræ momentum et extremi judicii diem intercurrents, respectu mortuorum, nullum sit. Mortuis namque nobis, et sic omni sensu temporis destitutis, momentum ultimum vitæ abeuntis, et momentum primum redeuntis (redibit autem in ultimo judicio) unum idemque revicturis videbitur. Qui profundo somno sopiti sunt, longum sæpe somni tractum non sentiunt. Omni autem somno profundior somnus est mors.*" Opera, p. 177. "*Concludendum est perinde agi cum iis, qui in Domino moriuntur, ac si statim ad Dominum migrarent, et ultimum vitæ mortalis punctum idem esse cum initio vitæ immortalis. A mortuis autem non sentiri tempus intermedium, inter mortem et vitam (resurrectionem), adeo manifestum est, ut, si quis contrarium affirmet, ei dicendum sit, mortuos vivere; quod seipsum evertit.*" Ib. p. 316.

There seems scarcely an argument, or Scriptural interpretation, advanced by Bishop Law and his followers, which has not been culled, or at least which may not be found, in the ponderous volumes of the celebrated Fratres Poloni. Take a specimen from Bishop Law of his perfect conformity with Crellius in obliterating all space of time between death and the day of judgment. "Perhaps," he says, "it may be questioned, whether he also (St. Paul) was not left in some degree of uncertainty about this last point, viz. that the world itself would speedily come to

these writers affix to the words, "sleep of the soul," for the truth of which proposition they strenuously contend. It does not distinctly appear, whether they conceive the soul to be a material, or an immaterial substance ; most probably an immaterial one (which Priestley derided under the name of a *negative* substance), although the use of the word *sleep* in connexion with it would seem to imply, that they deemed it a material one. *Sleep* is a term, when strictly taken, applicable only to the body, for while the body *sleeps*, the soul *dreams* ; and if it be remarked, that there are cases, in which it sometimes happens, that sleep is not accompanied with dreaming (of which my

an end. But if this notion seems too harsh, the difficulty may be solved otherwise more easily, upon a supposition, that the time of each man's death is *in respect of himself*, really *contiguous* to that of his resurrection. A doctrine which not only St. Paul, but two other disciples also, St. James and St. Peter, have taught *very expressly*, and which appears to deserve a little more attention than is usually given to it." Law's Consideration, &c. p. 163. ed. 1784. Again : " It seems to be of little consequence, *when* or *in what manner* this (change) be made ; whether we are to *sleep* first, or be found like those of the last generation ; since the times of our dying and rising again are in reality *coincident*, and our change either way alike *momentary* ; nor will it be any more to us than *the twinkling of an eye*." Ibid. p. 360.

own experience affords me no proof), the answer is obvious, that the persons dreamed but did not *recollect* their dreams. It appears, however, that, by this comparison, they meant to assert, that the state of the soul after death is one of total insensibility, void of all perception, and consciousness. But is this the case in sleep? Are we then without sensation? Or rather, are we not in some degree sensible even of external impressions? If a remarkable noise occurs during the period of sleep, is it not often conveyed to the soul through the organs of sensation, and are not our dreams affected by it? So also are we susceptible of feeling, if the touch be sufficiently strong, yet not strong enough to wake us; and that feeling exercises an influence on our dreams. Visible objects are of course unperceived, because our eyes are closed, and because the mind is employed internally upon objects impressed upon it, either by some superior power, or by the active energies of its own vivid imagination. Nor does sleep always prove a state of rest and cessation of motion to the soul or body; for sleepwalkers not only talk in their sleep, but get up, walk about, and often employ themselves in active occupations. The comparison therefore by no means holds, and the state of the soul after death, if it be a state of total in-

sensibility, without perception and consciousness, cannot be correctly compared to that of sleep.

But, it may be said, that to *sleep* and to *die* are terms used synonymously in Scripture, so much so that the *dead* are denominated, *those that sleep*. But I apprehend, that this phrase is generally misunderstood, and that no comparison is made in Scripture between *death* and *sleep*, but that the act of *lying down* is deemed applicable both to one and the other. Hence the verb *to lie down* signifies *metonymically* either *to sleep* or *to die*. This verb in the Old Testament is שָׁכַב, *shakàb*, which is constantly used when the phrase “to sleep with his fathers” occurs; but *shakàb* properly means *to lie down*, so that “*to sleep*,” should have been translated “*to lie down*” with his fathers. Kircher, in his *Concordance* to the *Septuagint*, accordingly remarks upon the sense of this verb, that its meaning is *to lie down* (*cubare*), and imports the motion of the body, inclining itself to a place underneath it, and that it does *not* signify *to sleep* (*dormire*), as is commonly supposed; a meaning which is expressed by the verb יָשַׁן, *jashàn*. Thus our own translators have sometimes correctly rendered it, as in *Genesis* xxviii. 13. “the land on which *thou liest*.” It is almost always translated in the *Septuagint* by

κοιμάομαι, a word of a similar meaning in Greek, and one which, consequently, is used in the same sense by the writers of the New Testament.

The proper Greek word for *to sleep* is καθεύδω, and the difference between the two expressions may be observed in Matthew xxii. 45, 46. where it is said, when Jesus “was come to his disciples he found them *lying down*, κοιμωμένους, for sorrow ; and said unto them, Why *sleep ye*,” καθεύδετε. Besides, there is a marked difference in the *tense*, when this term is applied to the dead. If the soul sleeps from death to the resurrection, and if this was the creed of the Apostles, the participle would have been used in the *present* tense, κοιμώμενοι, and not in the *past* tense, κοιμηθέντες, when speaking of those who might be supposed to be *still* sleeping. Thus in 1 Cor. xv. 18. “Then they also who *have* died (or lain down) in Christ, κοιμηθέντες, (not who *are* fallen asleep in Christ) are perished.” Again, 1 Thessalonians, “Them also who *have* died (or lain down) in Jesus, κοιμηθέντας (not who *sleep* in Jesus), will God bring with him.” Now had St. Paul entertained the same opinion as Bishop Law upon this subject, and understood the verb κοιμάομαι in the sense of *sleeping*, he would have used the participle of the *present* tense, τοὺς κοιμωμένους, *those who sleep*, as our translation renders it, and

not the participle of the *past* tense, τοὺς κοιμηθέντας, those who *have slept*, or rather died, in Christ ; for if he supposed their souls to be *still sleeping*, he could not have used the participle of the *past* tense. He seems, by adopting the word κοιμηθέντας, to have simply meant “ those who *have died* in Christ,” alluding to an occurrence *actually past*, and not to one *then in progress*.

The signification which I have annexed to this word will appear by reference to John xi. 11, 12, 13, a passage often quoted for a different purpose, to be correct. Our Saviour there says, “ Our friend Lazarus *has lain down*, κεκοίμηται (not as in our translation, *sleepeth*) ; but I go, that I may awake him, ἐξυπνίσω. Then said his disciples, Lord, if he *has lain down*, κεκοίμηται (not *if he sleep*), he shall do well. Howbeit Jesus spake of his death ; but they thought that he had spoken *of the lying down*, περὶ τῆς κοιμήσεως (not *of taking of rest*) to sleep, τοῦ ὑπνου.” It is here evident, that when he used the word κοιμάομαι (or rather שכב *shakàb*, which has precisely the same meaning in Hebrew, Chaldee, and Syriac, both literally and metonymically), he meant by it a *lying down to die* ; but his Apostles misconceiving its sense, thought that he meant a *lying down to sleep*, particularly as he added, “ but I go that I may *awake* him.” This

mistake they could not have made, if the expression had not had two distinct significations, as applied to two different things. And when our Saviour said, "I go that I may *awake* him, ἐξενίσσω, the verb *awake* seems to be used metaphorically for to raise up, or cause to rise up, as in Psalm cviii. 2. "*Awake* ערה, psalter and harp; I will *awake* אערה early;" where the word is taken in the first part of the verse *metaphorically*, as it is in the second part *literally*.

But, dropping the metaphor of sleep, the same writers contend that, as the soul sometimes suffers a temporary deprivation of its faculties *before* death, so may it *after* death. Thus a stunning blow will stun the soul as well as the body. It should, however, be remarked, that to *stun* is not to *destroy*. If immediate death does not succeed, the soul very soon resumes its activity; nor is it, even if a concussion of the brain follows, which is not instantly fatal, altogether inactive¹. I have somewhere

¹ It should be also observed, that a loss even of the substance of the brain is not always attended with a loss of the mental faculties. In "The Memoirs of the Philosophical Society at Manchester," there is an able paper upon this subject by Dr. Ferriar. He remarks, "The materialists deny the necessity of any thing more than the visible structure of the brain, to produce the act of thinking, in consequence of perception: but the

seen a case, related by Sir Astley Cooper, of a person who, in consequence of a fall, and the pressure of a bone upon the brain, lost for the space of, I believe, two or three years, the powers of reasoning and memory, in so much so that on the removal of the bone, and his subsequent recovery, he recollected nothing of what had passed in the interval. But was the person alluded to, or

contrary seems to be probable from these facts, which show that at different times *every part of that structure* has been *deeply injured*, or *totally destroyed*, without *impeding* or *changing* any part of the process of thought."—Vol. iv. p. 22. Again, "On the faith of my authors then I shall suppose it proved, that the thinking faculties have subsisted after the destruction of any superior or lateral part of the brain, and we will now consider how far they have survived the deprivation of the *cerebellum*." Haller says, *Non infrequentia ulcera cerebelli sunt, etiam cum integritate mentis, morsque inde lenta, duodecimo die, aut multo serior successit.* And he mentions several instances of scirrhus affecting the cerebellum, and producing death, *without previously injuring the faculties*."—Ib. p. 28. And the following is the conclusion at which Dr. Ferriar arrives: "On reviewing the whole of this evidence," (evidence which he minutely details,) "I am disposed to conclude, that *as no part of the brain* appears *essentially necessary to the existence of the intellectual faculties*, and as the *whole* of its visible structure has been *materially changed*, without *affecting the exercise of those faculties*, something more than the discernible organization must be requisite to produce the phenomena of thinking."—Ib. p. 43.

indeed is any person under a similar affliction, *altogether insensible, without perception or consciousness?* I conceive not. The senses of the body receive impressions, and convey those impressions to the soul, which perceives them, and is conscious both of them and of its own existence, although it cannot reason correctly, nor afterwards remember the circumstances which occurred during the prevalence of the disorder. To forget past impressions is one thing, but to be insensible to present impressions is another.

Nor is the state of the soul after death at all parallel in point of circumstances to the disordered state of it in this life. Here it is in strict and intimate connexion with the body, participating in all its enjoyments, and sympathizing with it in all its sufferings. As disease affects the great organ of the brain, so also may it at the same time affect the energies of the soul, which operate through that organ. But after death the connexion is altogether broken; the body decomposes, but what becomes of the soul experience affords us no information. To apply any law by which its operations, when in union with the body, are regulated or suspended, to any supposed regulation or suspension of its operations, when separated from the body, can lead to no satisfactory result.

Its powers may be paralyzed, and its energies controlled, by the defects of that material substance with which it is here combined ; but what possible reason have we to surmise, that, when free from this combination, it will hereafter continue in existence, endowed with faculties lying dormant, and with mind suppressed, a perfect blank in creation ? Why, the infidel will naturally ask, is this insignificant entity without energy, this intellect without intelligence, to be at all preserved ?

Besides, as it is admitted on all sides, that the disorders of the body, more or less, affect the soul, and that, according to an old maxim, expressive of true enjoyment, there should be

Mens sana in corpore sano,

is it in the slightest degree probable, that the soul should be only during this life in a sound and healthy state, which even now is subjected to occasional interruptions ; yet that, when this life terminates, it should then lie, to an undefined period, in a state of disease, torpor, and insensibility, and be, in point of consciousness, as if it had never been ? Is it probable, for instance, that the soul of Adam, after having lived his destined period, has continued for about five thousand

years, unconscious of its own existence, and that it will so continue, for perhaps some thousand years more, until the general resurrection ?

But it has been remarked, upon the other side, that, if the soul remains after death in a state of unconsciousness, it cannot be at all sensible of the lapse of time. This conclusion is certainly correct if the premisses be granted ; nor does it require any supereminent talent to convince us of it. But an important question here seems to be, not only whether the soul after death will be unconscious *of the lapse of time*, for if unconscious of every thing it must of course be unconscious of that, but whether when again endowed with intellect it will be *then* conscious of the time which has passed between its death and resurrection. I have remarked, that a period of about five thousand years has lapsed since the death of Adam, and that perhaps some thousands more will lapse before his soul and body will be again united, during all which time his soul is represented as lying in utter insensibility. Are we then hence to conclude, that as Adam has been, and still will be, unconscious of the lapse of time mentioned, he will be equally unconscious, or rather totally ignorant of it, after his resurrection, because “our notion of time is said to be drawn from the different

impressions on our mind succeeding one another¹?" If time, therefore, be altogether dependent upon the impressions of the mind, and that without those impressions we cannot possibly have a notion of it, it is certain, that Adam cannot possibly at the resurrection have any notion of the time, which he passed in insensibility. But should he look around him, and perceive so many millions of his descendants, who had been born, and had died in

¹ "View of a Future State, by a Country Pastor," p. 83.—The author adds in a note, "Accordingly, if we were to suppose the inward impressions, perceptions, and emotions, in two different kinds of animals, a *swallow* and a *tortoise*, for instance, to be exactly proportioned in their quickness or slowness of succession, to the bodily movements of each respectively,—on that supposition, the *swallow*, living perhaps less than ten years, might enjoy, to all practical purposes, a longer life than the *tortoise*, which lives more than a century." Are we then to admit the premisses thus assumed by the Country Pastor, and to say, that a man who rides *ten* miles in an hour, seems to live longer during that hour than another man, who rides only *five* miles in the same space of time? Or shall we not rather say, that the rapidity of his progress must make the prescribed period appear to the former man *shorter* instead of *longer*, than that of the latter; the hard trotting pace of ten miles an hour rendering less distinct, and consequently less efficient, the impressions, perceptions, and emotions of the mind, than the jog-trotting pace of five miles an hour? The jog-trotter may indulge in reverie, but the hard trotter cannot.

the period between his own death and resurrection, he will be convinced, that no inconsiderable lapse of time must have intervened, and entertain notions of that intervening lapse which could not have arisen from the impressions of past occurrences made upon his own mind. Leaving, however, the soul of Adam at rest, are not we ourselves perfectly conscious, that a very considerable portion of time will pass away after our own deaths until the resurrection ; and shall we not, when again alive, be conscious, although our souls should be insensible during the intermediate period, that such a considerable portion of time must have elapsed, by many concomitant circumstances, which will concur to prove it ? And must not such a consciousness add anxiety to the prospect, and embitter the retrospect, of being for so lengthened a period wholly blotted out, if not from existence, at least from all knowledge of it ? Thus it appears that we have some notion of time without receiving it from the number of individual impressions made upon our own minds ; and that the intermediate period in question will not appear to us as no time at all, either *before* its commencement or *after* its termination : for how can we contemplate it in that light now, when we expect it to be a period at least of ages ; or hereafter, when our former con-

ceptions shall revive, and a thousand things will prove to us, that it has been a very long interval?

Upon a review, therefore, of what has been said, if we reject the opinion of the Materialist, who regards mind as a mere property of matter; so also, I apprehend, unless better arguments are advanced in its support than I have met with, must we reject that of the Somnolist, who maintains the separate existence of a soul deep sunk in sleep, and of a spiritual substance, divested of spirit, and void of all sensibility¹.

¹ "It is conceivable, however, that the whole of the body may not be dissolved; that some portion of it, perhaps many times less than the *smallest grain of dust*, may be exempted from the general decay; may be, however minute, very curiously organized (for *great* and *small* are only comparative); may be the really essential part of the body, so as to be properly called by itself the body; and may remain in a torpid state, like a seed, ready to be again connected with the soul."—Country Pastor's View, p. 71. This is precisely the fancy of Priestley, but he imagined the soul, as being a mere property of the brain, to be included in this wonderful seed. The Country Pastor's *curious* seed seems only to include a sort of corporeal essence.

CHAPTER III.

Opinion of the Jews respecting the state of the dead.—That they believed the soul to exist after death, apparent from their use of the word *Sheöl*.—The translation of this word in the Septuagint.—Never signifies *the grave*.—Jacob's lamentation for Joseph.—The word necromancer in Deuteronomy.—Herodotus.—Saul and the Spirit of Samuel at Endor.—Jewish opinion shown from the Apocrypha.—Book of Ezra—Oriental versions of it.—Book of Enoch.

HAVING thus considered the reasoning of a writer, who represents intellect, as nothing more than an efflux from a peculiar property of the brain, as well as that of those, who conceive that spirit may lie dormant without spirituality, and even without any knowledge or consciousness of its own existence, I now proceed to discuss the more general opinion, that the soul survives its separation from the body, and preserves in that separate state not only a consciousness of its own existence and personal identity, but also the exercise of its perceptive and rational faculties.

The first argument which strikes us on this momentous subject, is derived from the universality of the persuasion, that our existence will not terminate with death ; *all* nations believing, except

a few uncivilized tribes, with whose language, customs, and opinions, we are very little acquainted, that the soul outlives the dissolution of the body. But as this is an argument which has been frequently brought forward, and ably urged, I shall not dwell upon it; but confine myself to the opinion upon the point entertained by that nation, from which we have received the oracles of truth.

The earliest records of the Jews, the earliest records indeed extant of any nation, afford ample testimony of their persuasion, that man is not doomed to perish in the grave. Even Bishop Warburton, who held that Moses only enforced his law by the sanction of *temporal* rewards and punishments, and that all allusion to the joys and sorrows of a future life was carefully avoided in his writings, nevertheless, at the same time admitted, that the separate existence of the soul after death was the general belief of the whole nation at that early æra¹. Priestley, however, on the other hand, maintained that the notion of the soul, being a substance distinct from the body, was not known to the writers of the Scriptures, and especially to those of the *old* Testament². But he was

¹ "I hold the early Jews did believe the soul survived the body."—*Divine Legation*, vol. ii. part ii. p. 556.

² *Disquisitions*, vol. i. p. 167.

so strangely led astray by an overweening love of singularity, that he was constantly in search of some new opinion ; and what he once adopted he unhesitatingly asserted, and ever after strenuously defended.

That the Jews believed the soul to exist after a separation from the body, appears evident from the single circumstance of the Hebrew language having a word appropriated to the very place which it was supposed to inhabit. That word is שְׁאוֹל *Shedl*. Now this expression is used in the old Testament *two and sixty times* ; and is translated in the Septuagint by the Greek word ᾗδης (*Hades*) *sixty*, out of the *sixty and two times* ; and in the other two instances by θάνατος. It is well known, that the proper meaning of “ *Hades*” in Greek is, “ the habitation of departed spirits,” which was supposed to be divided into two distinct regions ; into Tartarus, the place of punishment, and into Elysium, the place of enjoyment. But although this be the proper meaning of the expression, it is nevertheless sometimes used metonymically, (that is, as a metonymy of the effect for the cause,) in the abstract sense of *death*, the cause of the soul’s departure from this world to the next. Hence it appears, that the authors of that version considered ᾗδης (*hell*), the *proper* meaning of *Shedl*, and

θάνατος (*death*), the *metonymical* meaning of it; as ἄδης (*hell*) was sometimes put for θάνατος (*death*), metonymically in their own language¹.

But the authors of the Septuagint, in no one instance, affixed to ἡνση (*Shedl*) the sense of τάφος, a *grave* or *sepulchre*. Our English translators, however, have only rendered it in *thirty-five*² out of the *sixty-two* passages, in which it occurs by the appropriate term *hell*; translating it a *grave* in *twenty-four*³, and a *pit* in *three*⁴, of the remaining passages. By giving it therefore the sense of a

¹ ταχὺς γὰρ ἄδης ῥᾶστος ἀνδρὶ δυστυχεῖ. "For (*hell*) *death* is most grateful to an unhappy man." Eurip. Hippolytus, 1047. Ἦς αἰδὸν μέλλοντα προέφθασεν εὐστοχος ὥδεις. "Whose well-timed pain (of parturition) prevented the approaching (*hell*) *death*."—Anthologia, Lib. i. cap. 33. iv. Ed. Bosch. vol. i. p. 130.

² Deut. xxxii. 22. Job x. 18; xxvi. 6. 2 Samuel xxii. 6. Proverbs xxiii. 14. Psalms ix. 18; xvi. 10; xvii. 6; xxx. 3; lv. 16; lxxxvi. 12; cxvi. 3; cxxxix. 8. Proverbs v. 5: vii. 29; ix. 18; xvii. 24; xxvii. 20; xxx. 16; Eccles. ix. 10. Isaiah v. 14; xiv. 9—15; xxviii. 15—18; lvii. 9. Ezechiel xxxi. 16, 17; xxxii. 26. Hosea xiii. 13, 14. Amos ix. 2. Josiah ii. 3. Habakkuk ii. 5.

³ Genes. xxxvii. 35; xlv. 29—31. 1 Samuel ii. 6. 1 Kings ii. 6—9. Job vii. 9; xiv. 13; xvii. 13; xxi. 13. Psalms vi. 6; xxxi. 18; xlix. 14, 15; lxxxviii. 3; lxxxix. 48; cxli. 7. Proverbs l. 12. Canticles viii. 6. Isaiah xiv. 11; xxxviii. 10—18. Ezechiel xxxi. 15.

⁴ Numbers xvi. 30—33. Job. xvii. 16.

grave, they put upon it an interpretation, unknown to the authors of the Septuagint. But it was one which had been the subject of controversy before they commenced their labours. The Protestants on one side had strenuously contended for this sense of the word *Hades*, and the adherents of the Church of Rome on the other side, had as strenuously contended, that it could never be made to bear any meaning of the kind. Beza, however, in defence of his annotation upon Acts ii. 27¹, fairly confesses, what in his eye gave importance to such an apparently unprofitable bone of contention. In this case, he said, I have not acted unadvisedly, since I perceive that this place in particular is wrested by the Papists to support their doctrine of a Limbus Patrum, and since the ancients also may have from thence imagined, that the soul of Christ descended into hell². At the same time nevertheless he admitted, that the word ᾗδης (*inferi*) occasionally signifies something besides *the grave*, “neque etiam nego, inferorum nomine

¹ Non permittes *me* permanere in *sepulchro*.

² “Non temere feci, quum hunc præcipue locum a Papistis torqueri ad suum Limbum videamus, et veteres etiam inde descensum illum animæ Christi ad inferos excogitarint.”—T. Bezae Volumen primum Tractationum Theologicarum, p. 460.

aliquid etiam aliud interdum significatur, quam *sepulchrum*."

It is not however material to my argument, whether *Sheöl* may, or may not, in one or more instances, signify *the grave*, as it is at the same time held, occasionally at least, to signify *hell*, or the habitation of departed spirits. The authors of the Septuagint version thought the latter was its true signification, never once rendering it by the former ; and our own translators rendered it in more than half the times, in which it occurred, in exact conformity with the Septuagint. Nor do I think any proof has been given, that it ever correctly bears the signification of *a grave*. Some Lexicographers indeed have annexed that meaning to it ; but not as its proper meaning, ; its proper meaning they admit to be *hell*, or the receptacle of dead men, both good and bad ; also *the state of the dead* ; but they add likewise, that it has the meaning of *a grave metonymically*. I do not however understand, how *a grave*, the receptacle of the *body*, can be put metonymically for *hell*, the receptacle of the *soul*. For *death*, it may be put by a metonymy of the *effect* for the *cause* ; but for *the grave* it seems incapable of being put by a metonymy of any kind.

With respect to the true sense of *Sheöl* and

hades, translated by the English word *Hell*, I will quote in explanation a passage from Ainsworth, an old and able commentator on the Pentateuch and Psalms ; who, in his Annotations on Psalm xvi. 10. remarks, “The word *Hell* properly signifieth *deep*, whether it be *high* or *low* ; and though by custom it is usually taken for the place of devils, and the damned, yet the word is more large, and as *heaven* is not only the dwelling place of God and his saints, but generally all places above us, where the stars, the clouds, the winds, the birds, &c. are, as is showed, Psalm viii. 9. ; so *hell* is all places beneath. Wherefore it may in this large sense serve to express the Hebrew word *Sheol* here used. It is a place or estate, which *all men*, even *the best*, ‘come unto ; for Jacob made account to go thither, Gen. xxxvii. 35. and Job desired to be there, Job xiv. 13. (for he knew it should be his house, Job xvii. 13.), and our Lord Jesus Christ was there, as this Psalm (xvi. 10.) with Acts ii. 31. sheweth.” To this remark of Ainsworth I will subjoin another from Bishop Pearson’s Exposition of the Creed ; who, having noticed an opinion, that the term *hell* signifies “ no *place*, either of the man, or of the body, or of the soul ; but only the *state* or condition of men in death,” opposes it in the following words : “ But

this interpretation supposeth that which can never appear, that *Hades* signifieth not death itself, nor the place where souls departed are, but the state and condition of the dead, or their permansion in death ; which is a notion wholly *new*, and consequently cannot interpret that, which representeth something known, and believed, *of old*, according to the notions and conceptions of those times. And that this notion is wholly new will appear, because not any one of the ancient fathers is produced to avow it, nor any of the heathen authors, which are produced, do affirm it. Nay, it is evident that the *Greeks* did always by *Hades* understand a *place* into which the souls of men were carried and conveyed, distinct and separate from that place in which we live¹.”

As therefore the Jews had a word in their language appropriated to a place, where souls were supposed to exist after their separation from the body [in the same way as the Greeks had a word in theirs expressive of a similar place and a similar existence, although that word may have been sometimes used metonymically from a circumstance connected with its import] ; does it not follow, that the Jews must have believed in the

¹ Article V. ed. 1701. p. 233.

reality of such a place, and such an existence? Nor is it sufficient to show, that the word is sometimes used metonymically, even if we were to grant the metonymical use of it in the sense contended for; unless it be also shown, that it was never at any period used in its *proper* sense; a position which would involve the absurdity of supposing that a derivative could have been formed without the previous formation of its primitive. But passages are not wanting in the Old Testament to prove, that the opinion in controversy was that of the Jewish nation from the earliest times. Thus Jacob, lamenting the loss of his son Joseph, (Genesis xxxv. 35.) exclaims, "I will go down (not *into the grave* as the authorized version has it, for he supposed Joseph to have been devoured by wild beasts, but) *to hell* (as Ainsworth more correctly translated it) unto my son mourning."

In the law of Moses also among those who are styled an abomination to the Lord, is enumerated the *necromancer*, Deut. xviii. 11. or, as it is literally rendered by Ainsworth, *he that seeketh unto the dead*. Now *necromancy* is a Greek word, converted into English, Νεκρομαντεία, and is thus explained by Scapula after Hesychius, "Vaticinium ex *evocatis mortuis*; responsum quod *inferorum umbræ evocatæ* de futuris reddunt." This explana-

ation is related as having passed between Sammel and Saul, in which the former said, "Why hast thou troubled me to bring me in?" v. 15. and then prophetically renounces to Saul his death and that of his sons in the next day, in these words: "To-morrow shalt thou and thy sons be with me." v. 19. It would be surely violating every principle of common sense to understand these passages as related by one who was persuaded that Sammel himself did not ~~appear~~, and did not foretell the death of Saul. Besides, the author of *Reclinations*, at a much later period, refers to this very narrative, and distinctly states, that Sammel "after his death prophesied, and told the king his end, and lifted up his voice from the

upon Saul, from whose attendants the old woman might learn his present circumstances, and desperate situation, and thence be able to foretell his fate, without such a pretended information from the prophet's ghost: and that Saul himself really saw nothing all the while, but judged of the whole transaction from the woman's story, which was framed in conformity with his own superstitious prejudices; see Le Clerc. Though we must own with this judicious commentator, that such a silly lying practice as that of *necromancy* did indeed imply the vulgar opinion of a separate existence, and that it commonly prevailed amongst the Jews. Nor might the historian himself perhaps be altogether free from a tincture of the same prejudice." *Law's Considerations*, &c. p. 418.

earth," chap. xlvi. 20¹. It matters not therefore, whether the woman imposed upon the king, which, if the prophecy be admitted as a fact, could not have been, or even whether the writer of it was or was not inspired ; but the question rather is, whether he believed what he wrote, in common with others, from whom he received it, and recorded that which, after due inquiry, he knew to be true.

I omit other allusions in the Old Testament to the habitation of departed spirits under the name of *Shedl*, because I conceive these sufficient for the conviction of all who are not resolved, under the influence of an inflexible philosophy, to explain away what they do not approve, and to overwhelm with metonymical or metaphorical significations the obvious and literal sense of Scripture. To the proofs, however, which I have adduced from the canonical books of the Old Testament, I will add a quotation or two from the Apocrypha, in corroboration of the same point. In Ecclesias-

¹ Josephus also, in his Antiquities, Book vi. chap. 15. giving an account of the whole transaction, represents the appearance as real. He states that the woman *called Samuel from hell*, καλεῖ τοῦτον ἐξ ᾗδου, and expressly affirms that the *soul* of Samuel conversed with Saul. τῆς δὲ Σαμουήλου ψυχῆς πυθομένης, *the soul of Samuel inquiring*, &c.

ticus it is said ; “ There is no inquisition into thy life (ἐλεγμὸς ζωῆς, *accusatio vitæ*, Vulg.) in *Hell*, (ἐν ᾗδου, *in inferno*, Vulg.) whether thou have lived ten, or a hundred, or a thousand years,” xli. 4. Can such a judicial process, as an inquisition into a fact, be supposed to take place *in the grave*, as our translators render it ? But in another part of Ecclesiasticus, xlviii. 5. our translators give a very different and more correct meaning to the same word ᾗδου ; “ Who didst raise up a dead man from death, and his soul from *the place of the dead*,” ἐξ ᾗδου, alluding to Elijah’s causing the soul of the widow’s son to reanimate his dead body, 1 Kings xvii. 22.

But there is likewise a passage in the *second* Book of Ezra, according to the English version, (the *fourth*, according to the Vulgate) which seems to bear directly on the point. Ezra inquires, “ How and when shall these things (the end of the world) come to pass ?” 2 Esdras iv. 33. The answer which the angel gives him is this ; “ Do not thou hasten above the most Highest. Do not the souls also of the righteous ask questions of these things *in their chambers*, saying, How long shall I hope on this fashion ? When cometh the fruit of the floor of our reward ?” ver. 34, 35. Again the Angel says unto him, “ In *hell* (in

inferno) the *chambers* of souls are like the womb of a woman ; for like as a woman, that travaileth maketh haste to escape the necessity of the travail, even so do *these places* hasten to deliver those things, which are committed to them," ver. 41, 42. The Greek original of this book, if indeed the Greek *was* the original) is lost ; but ancient versions of it exist in Latin (the Vulgate), Ethiopic¹, and Arabic². Now by a reference to one of the oriental versions we perceive the true meaning of that which our translators have expressed by the word *chambers*. In Latin it is *promptuaria*, which properly signifies *storehouses*, and which they elsewhere translate (vii. 32.) *secret places*. But in the Ethiopic it is *abyatihon*, which means *their houses* or *dwellings*. And as in verse 41. the Vulgate has *inferno*, so also has the Ethiopic *Shedl*. It is therefore evident, that the *chambers* or *habitations* in which departed souls are here stated to dwell, are places situated in *Shedl*, equally the seats of happiness and of misery. Indeed the opinion under discussion cannot be more distinctly asserted, than it is in chap. vii. 32. of the same book, where it

¹ See "Primi Ezræ Libri Versio Æthiopica," discovered, and published by Dr. Laurence, with a translation, at Oxford, 1820.

² A collation of the Arabic version with the Vulgate is given by Fabricius, in his *Codex Pseudepigraphus*, v. iii. p. 193, &c.

is said, "And the earth shall restore those who are asleep (in the Ethiopic, *shakabu, have lain down*) in her, and so shall the dust those that dwell in silence (Ethiopic *rest in it*), and *the secret places* shall deliver *those souls that were committed unto them.*" And no doubt, I conceive, will remain respecting the express meaning of this passage, when I give it as quoted from the Latin version of his day by St. Ambrose; "Et terra reddet *defunctorum corpora*, et pulvis reddet eas, quæ in tumultis requiescunt, *reliquias mortuorum*, et *habitacula* (promptuaria, in the Vulgate,) red-
dent *animas*, quæ *his commendatæ sunt.*"

I should add to the above remarks, that the authors of our own version, who had only the Vulgate to consult, translated *in inferno* (iv. 41.) *in the grave*; a signification never before given to the Latin term *infernus*. Probably the error arose from the difficulty of finding a word in the English language of a similar extended meaning; for the word *hell* is now by custom appropriated to *a place of punishment*, and never means *a place of happiness*, as is the case of *infernus*, which comprehends in its signification both the one and the other. Thus, as *Sheôl* in Hebrew, is appropriated not only to a place of punishment (*Gehenna*), but also to a place of happiness (*Paradise*), and as *Hades* in Greek

has precisely the same import ; so likewise has *infernus* in Latin. In conformity with this comprehensive appropriation of the synonymous term in the respective languages, a distinct allusion to the situation of both places, side by side, occurs in the Ethiopic and Arabic versions¹, which is not found in the Vulgate. In the former it is said, “ Then shall the pit of condemnation (in the Arabic *the abyss of punishments*) lie open before the place (Arabic, *opposed to the habitations*) of consolation ; and the furnace of *Gehenna* shall appear before the *paradise* of joy.” (In the Arabic, *the depth of hell shall appear, to which shall be opposed Paradise, wonderfully pleasant, and full of goodness and joy.*) Again, “ Behold you see before you on (one) side joy and consolation, and on the (other) side condemnation and fire.” This in the Arabic runs thus—“ Behold, the pleasure of consolation (is) before your eyes ; and an inextinguishable fire surrounds you.” These quotations require no comment. But a still more express allusion to the subject in controversy is to be found in the 49th and 51st verses of the same chapter. Ezra

¹ In these versions a whole chapter is inserted between the 35th and 36th verses of the seventh chapter of the Vulgate. The above passages constitute the 1st and 3d verses of the Ethiopic and Arabic inserted chapter.

asks the following question of the angel : “ When we die, and our souls depart from each of us, shall we be preserved in tranquillity until the period arrive when He shall establish his judgment ? Or shall we be judged from that very time ? ” This is the Ethiopic version. The Arabic version is thus expressed, as usual, more paraphrastically : “ After this present death, when the soul is resigned by every one, shall we be then concealed in a place of tranquillity, until the time in which thou shalt exercise judgment in justice, and shalt change them (us) into new creatures ; or shall we be immediately hurried to punishment ? ” The following is the answer of the angel : “ When the word, the order, (*the decree*, Arabic) has gone forth from the Most High, and He hath ordained some one to die, then the spirit of that man goes out of his body (*his spirit and whatsoever of life he possesses is changed, until it goes out of his body*, Arabic), that it may return to him (*God*, Arabic) who gave it. And first it prostrates itself before the glory of the Most High.”

The exact period when this book of Ezra was composed, has not been ascertained ; but perhaps it was not long before the commencement of the Christian æra. There is likewise another Apocry-

phal work, *the book of Enoch*, recently translated from the Ethiopic, which is corroborative of Jewish opinion at a period perhaps more nearly approaching the birth of Christ. It is there said in a description of Paradise : “ These are the delightful places, where the spirits, the souls of the dead, will be collected ; for them were they formed ; and here will be collected all the souls of the sons of men. These places, in which they dwell, shall they occupy, *until* the day of judgment, and *until* their appointed period.” Chap. xxii. 3, 4. Again, it is added : “ In the same way likewise are sinners separated when they die, and are buried in the earth ; judgment not overtaking them in their life-time. Here are their souls separated. Moreover abundant is their suffering, *until* the time of *the great judgment*,” verses 11, 12. So also in the hundred and second chapter ; “ Fear not, ye souls of the righteous, but wait with patient hope for *the day of your death* in righteousness. Grieve not because your souls descend in great trouble to *the receptacle of the dead*¹. The spirits of you who

¹ *Veshta sheòl*, to hell, in the original. This phrase, therefore, *receptacle of the dead*, should have been translated *hell*. *Sheòl* is an Ethiopic as well as Hebrew word. The translator seems to have used this periphrasis in order to avoid the ambiguous sense of the word *hell*, which to an English ear would have con-

die in righteousness shall exist and rejoice. Woe to you, sinners, when you die in your sins. Has it not been shown to them (sinners) that when to *the receptacle of the dead* their souls shall be made to descend, their evil deeds shall become their greatest torment? Into darkness, into the snare, and into the flame, which shall burn to the great judgment, shall their spirits enter; and the great judgment shall be for every generation, even for ever." verses 6 and 7. chap. ciii. 4, 5.

To consult, therefore, the writings of the Jews, who lived before the birth of our Saviour, and to persuade ourselves, that they did not believe in the existence of the soul after death, appears to me little better than to pervert the meaning of the plainest language, and to shut our eyes against the clearest light of conviction.

veyed a meaning different from what was intended. In this he has deviated a little from that very literal rendering of the Ethiopic, for which De Sacy (*Journal de Savans*, October, 1822, p. 595) gives him credit, and which has induced Hoffman to take the English version as his guide in his German translation of Enoch. *Das Buch Henoch*, Von A. Gottlieb Hoffmann, Jenæ, 1833.

CHAPTER IV.

General opinion of the Jews respecting the soul—Opinion of the Apostles—The Sadducees—Transfiguration on the Mount no vision—Protomartyr St. Stephen—St. Peter—St. Paul—St. John—Opinion of our Saviour—The rich man and Lazarus—Our Saviour's appearance after his Resurrection—Penitent thief on the Cross—Socinian writers—Wolzogenius—Crellius—Paradise—Nature of disembodied spirits unrevealed—Conclusion.

THE same speculative and singular writer, who held, that the opinion under consideration was unknown to the authors of the Old Testament, maintained also that it was “*unquestionably* the opinion of *the Apostles* and early Christians, be the nature of the soul what it may, that its percipient and thinking powers *cease at death* ¹.” From the Old Testament, therefore, I proceed to the New. And here, I persuade myself, a mass of evidence is to be found, which if investigated with sincerity, and embraced with simplicity, cannot but prove decisive of the question. And not merely decisive

¹ Disquisitions, vol. i. p. 224.

of that part of the question, which relates to that which was the *general* creed of the Jews on the future state of the soul, but also of the more important part of it, which relates to that which was the creed *in particular* of our blessed Lord and his Apostles ; and which points out what, as founders of Christianity, they themselves taught upon the same subject¹. I shall therefore inquire into the prevailing belief on this point at the period of Christ's appearance upon earth, into the belief

¹ Opinions have been attributed to the inspired writers of Scripture both in the Old and New Testament, which they themselves never entertained, by a system of interpretation, which extracts an apparent sense from particular passages in direct hostility to that of others. Thus some, arguing from partial quotations, have represented David as asserting the extinction of soul and body in the grave ; forgetful of others, which are clearly in direct opposition to such an opinion, and even of that which St. Peter himself adduces, not only in proof, that there is a place appointed for the reception of the soul after its separation from the body (Acts ii.), but also in proof, that the soul of our Saviour was there between his death and resurrection. In the same way one might argue that Pope was a materialist from the following epitaph written by him :—

“ How loved, how honoured once, avails thee not,
To whom related, or by whom begot ;
A heap of dust *alone* remains of thee ;
’Tis *all* thou art, *all* that the proud shall be.”

But that the poet was no materialist appears evident from many

of his Apostles, and into that of our Saviour himself.

The opinion that the soul survives the body, was indeed the general, but not the universal, one at the time alluded to. The two prevailing sects of the day were those of the Pharisees and Sadducees, the latter of which we are told "say there is no resurrection, nor angel, nor spirit, but the Pharisees confess both," Acts xxiii. 8. And here it may be remarked that from the word *confess*, ὁμολογοῦσι, applied to the Pharisees, we may infer, that the creed to which they assented was that of

passages in his writings, particularly in a short poem entitled, "The dying Christian to his soul."

"Vital spark of heavenly flame,
Quit, oh quit, this mortal frame,
Trembling, hoping, lingering, flying,
Oh! the pain, the bliss of dying.
Cease, fond nature, cease this strife,
And let me languish into life.
Hark, they whisper! Angels say
Sister spirit, come away."

Surely it would be the perversion of criticism to argue from these quotations, that in the former the poet had in his contemplation the dissolution of the soul as well as of the body; or that in the latter he did not distinctly allude to the flight of the soul upon the dissolution of the body to a separate state of actual existence.

the multitude. The Sadducees *said* (λέγουσι,) or *asserted* what the multitude did not believe; but the Pharisees adhered to the general confession of faith. That this was the fact is expressly stated by Josephus, a Jewish historian contemporary with the Apostles. After noticing the opinions of the Sadducees that the soul is extinguished with the body, he observes that of this sect the number is *but small*, Antiq. lib. xviii. cap. 2. And it is recorded in St. Matthew, that when our Saviour put the Sadducees to silence, by refuting their opinions, the multitudes were astonished, ἐξεπλήσσοντο, *struck with admiration* at his argument. The Sadducees believing that the soul dies with the body, ridiculed the idea of a future resurrection, in which both soul and body should again be united. But our Saviour, in answer, told them, that they erred from ignorance of the Scriptures; and then in order to subvert the very foundation of their error, a belief in the mortality of the soul, pointed out to them, that the souls of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were still living, when God proclaimed himself to Moses as the God of those three patriarchs after the dissolution of their bodies; adding that God was not the God of *the dead*, but of *the living*; and thus proving, that the soul exists after death to be again united to the body at the general

resurrection. For if it does not thus exist, and that in full consciousness of its being, a future resurrection of the *same* man would be altogether impossible. The Sadducees perceiving these things, and finding their favourite position untenable, wisely held their tongues, and retreated from the conflict. Matthew chap. xxii. 32, 33.

But the Apostles themselves not only believed in the existence of departed spirits, but also in their reappearance on earth. And from whence could this belief have arisen, unless from the prevalent creed of the time in which they lived? When they saw our Lord walking on the sea in the dead of night, they cried out in terror, exclaiming, "It is a spirit." Matthew xiv. 26. Again, when he appeared to them after his resurrection and suddenly stood in the midst of them, they were terrified and affrighted, supposing that they saw a spirit. Luke xxiv. 17. Nay so excited were their feelings, and so possessed were they with the idea of their beholding a disembodied spirit, that they scarcely credited the reality of his corporeal appearance, even when for that express purpose he showed them his hands and his feet, which had been pierced with the nails of the cross. Neither could they be fully persuaded of it, alternately agitated by joy and astonishment, until

they gave him food, and saw him eat before them. Is it possible for circumstances to prove more completely, or language to describe more strongly, their belief in the existence of departed spirits, and their temporary disbelief in the corporeal presence and personal identity of our Saviour after his death and burial ?

This single reference, therefore, must be deemed, I apprehend, sufficient to demonstrate the creed of the Apostles on this subject ; and to disprove the unwarrantable assertion, that they unquestionably supposed the percipient and thinking powers of the soul to cease at death. But this, it may be said, only demonstrates the opinion of the Apostles upon the point, and that opinion might have been superstitious and erroneous ; for what will not sceptics affirm ? It proves that they saw our Saviour, both in soul and body, arisen from the dead ; but where is the proof, that they ever saw any other person alive after a departure from this life ? Yet even this proof is not altogether wanting in their testimony.

It is recorded by St. Matthew, as well as by St. Mark and St. Luke, that our blessed Lord taking up with him three of the Apostles, Peter, James, and John, was transfigured before them, his face shining like the sun, and his raiment

being white as the light; and that these Apostles beheld there two men, *Moses and Elias* (Elijah), talking with him, chap. xvii. 2, 3. And St. Luke has further preserved the subject of their conversation, by informing us, that "they spake of his decease, which he should accomplish at Jerusalem," chap. ix. 31. Hence it appears, that they not only *saw* Moses and Elias, but *heard* them conversing with Christ, many centuries after the death of each. Elias (Elijah) it is true was taken up alive into heaven, without being subjected to the common lot of mortality; but this was not the case with Moses, who is stated to have died in the land of Moab, and to have been buried there in a valley over against Beth-peor. Deut. xxxiv. 5, 6. Here, then, the Evangelists bear witness to a fact, in which they suspected not the least deception; to the fact of their having seen the person, and heard the conversation, of one who had been dead more than fourteen centuries before the period at which the transaction took place.

I am aware that some commentators have considered the entire occurrence of the transfiguration, and the circumstances accompanying it, as a mere vision; as something which passed before the eyes of the Apostles, deep sunk in extasy, a fictitious and not a real appearance. This con-

that the soul which occupies the present body of a man will be *one and the same* soul after its complete extinction by death, with that which will hereafter occupy not his present body, but a new and incorruptible body at the day of judgment? That the restoration of consciousness, while life remains in us, should accompany the restoration of the soul to its mental activity, we readily understand; but how the restoration of consciousness can take place, after the vital principle has been extinguished by death, and with it the soul itself, is utterly inconceivable. Essences and quintessences are universally exploded from the philosophy of modern chemistry; and it is surely time to explode them from the philosophy of modern metaphysics. It is indeed true, that Almighty power can effect every thing, at least every thing which is *possible*; but to say that it can effect *impossibilities* involves a manifest absurdity, and a direct contradiction in terms.

Admitting, therefore, that the consciousness of personal identity, must, according to the scheme of the materialist, be lost in the grave, and that the man of the resurrection will be an absolutely new being, in what manner, we may ask, can rewards and punishments be then awarded to those, who, from their previous conduct, are neither

entitled to the one, nor have deserved the other ? Would it not be absurd to suppose, that one man will be rewarded for virtues performed, or be punished for crimes perpetrated, by another ? But, if we believe the soul to be preserved in existence after death until the resurrection, no difficulty will arise in accounting for the mode in which it retains its consciousness of personal identity ; preserved, not in an insensible germ of supposed entity, but in a sensible state of actual existence.

In the Articles of the Church of England, as first established in the year 1552, there was one upon the very point under consideration. It was this : “ They which say, that the souls of such as depart hence do *sleep*, being *without all sense, feeling, or perceiving*, until the day of judgment ; or affirm that the souls *die with the bodies*, and at the last day shall be raised up with the same, do utterly dissent from the right belief, declared to us in Holy Scripture.” The controversy, therefore, did not originate with Priestley ; but is at least as old as the Reformation. He only revived it, zealously embracing, and pertinaciously defending, the opinion censured in the latter part of the Article. Nor have there been wanting theorists in modern times, who have maintained the opinion alluded to in the former part of the Article, viz.

that the soul sleeps without sense or perception, although not annihilated between death and the resurrection. Dr. E. Law, formerly Bishop of Carlisle, published a treatise expressly in support of this position ; whose reasoning has been since adopted by other writers, and urged sometimes with hesitation and sometimes with confidence, but never with more ability than by the Bishop himself¹.

¹ I mean among writers of more modern times ; for the early champions of Socinianism supported this and their other peculiar opinions with a refinement of reasoning, subtle, but illusory, which has never been since exceeded, or seldom perhaps, if ever, equalled. Socinus, the founder of the sect, gives the following comment upon Matthew x. 28. and Luke xx. 38. “De loco illo, cujus explicationem quæris, ita statuo ; ibi *animæ* nomine, quemadmodum alibi sæpissime, *vitam* significari, *quæ* certè non occiditur, etiamsi *corpus ipsum* occiditur. *Vivere* enim adhuc apud Deum is dici et potest et debet, qui *aliquando* in vitam, eamque immortalem ab ipso omnino *revocabitur*.” Opera, vol. I. p. 454. Again : “*Vivunt* Deo Abrahamus, Isaacus, et Jacobus, siquidem *resurrecturi sunt*. Sin minus planè sunt mortui, quare, cum Deus se Deum illorum esse dicat, Deus autem non mortuorum sed viventium sit, *ut resurgant necesse est*. Ita fit ut eodem tempore, sed diversa tamen ratione, ipsi etiam Deo et *mortui sint* et *vivant*. Vivunt Deo, quatenus eis vitam æternam omnino constituit. Mortui sunt Deo, quatenus *nondum* eam vitam *illis dedit*.” Ib. p. 145. An ingenious mode of attempting to prove, that the soul may be said to survive the body, not only

I cannot, however, collect from any thing which I have read upon the subject, what precise idea

because the *soul* and the *life* are sometimes expressed by the same word, but because the life, although *in point of fact extinct*, yet still exists in the eye of God, who intends, at some future but distant period, to restore it! Take another specimen of Socinian talent from the works of Crellius: “Totum illud tempus, inter *ultimum vitæ nostræ* momentum et *extremi judicii diem* intercurrentes, *respectu mortuorum*, nullum sit. Mortuis namque nobis, et sic omni sensu temporis destitutis, momentum *ultimum vitæ abeuntis*, et momentum *primum redeuntis* (redibit autem in ultimo judicio) *unum idemque* revicturis videbitur. Qui profundo somno sopiti sunt, longum sæpe somni tractum non sentiunt. Omni autem somno profundior somnus est mors.” Opera, p. 177. “Concludendum est perinde agi cum iis, qui in Domino moriuntur, ac si *statim* ad Dominum migrarent, et *ultimum vitæ mortalis punctum idem esse cum initio vitæ immortalis*. A mortuis autem non sentiri tempus intermedium, inter mortem et vitam (resurrectionem), adeo manifestum est, ut, si quis contrarium affirmet, ei dicendum sit, *mortuos vivere*; quod seipsum evertit.” Ib. p. 316.

There seems scarcely an argument, or Scriptural interpretation, advanced by Bishop Law and his followers, which has not been culled, or at least which may not be found, in the ponderous volumes of the celebrated Fratres Poloni. Take a specimen from Bishop Law of his perfect conformity with Crellius in obliterating all space of time between death and the day of judgment. “Perhaps,” he says, “it may be questioned, whether he also (St. Paul) was not left in some degree of uncertainty about this last point, viz. that the world itself would speedily come to

these writers affix to the words, "sleep of the soul," for the truth of which proposition they strenuously contend. It does not distinctly appear, whether they conceive the soul to be a material, or an immaterial substance; most probably an immaterial one (which Priestley derided under the name of a *negative* substance), although the use of the word *sleep* in connexion with it would seem to imply, that they deemed it a material one. *Sleep* is a term, when strictly taken, applicable only to the body, for while the body *sleeps*, the soul *dreams*; and if it be remarked, that there are cases, in which it sometimes happens, that sleep is not accompanied with dreaming (of which my

an end. But if this notion seems too harsh, the difficulty may be solved otherwise more easily, upon a supposition, that the time of each man's death is *in respect of himself*, really *contiguous* to that of his resurrection. A doctrine which not only St. Paul, but two other disciples also, St. James and St. Peter, have taught *very expressly*, and which appears to deserve a little more attention than is usually given to it." Law's Consideration, &c. p. 163. ed. 1784. Again: "It seems to be of little consequence, *when* or *in what manner* this (change) be made; whether we are to *sleep* first, or be found like those of the last generation; since the times of our dying and rising again are in reality *coincident*, and our change either way alike *momentary*; nor will it be any more to us than *the twinkling of an eye*." Ibid. p. 360.

own experience affords me no proof), the answer is obvious, that the persons dreamed but did not *recollect* their dreams. It appears, however, that, by this comparison, they meant to assert, that the state of the soul after death is one of total insensibility, void of all perception, and consciousness. But is this the case in sleep? Are we then without sensation? Or rather, are we not in some degree sensible even of external impressions? If a remarkable noise occurs during the period of sleep, is it not often conveyed to the soul through the organs of sensation, and are not our dreams affected by it? So also are we susceptible of feeling, if the touch be sufficiently strong, yet not strong enough to wake us; and that feeling exercises an influence on our dreams. Visible objects are of course unperceived, because our eyes are closed, and because the mind is employed internally upon objects impressed upon it, either by some superior power, or by the active energies of its own vivid imagination. Nor does sleep always prove a state of rest and cessation of motion to the soul or body; for sleepwalkers not only talk in their sleep, but get up, walk about, and often employ themselves in active occupations. The comparison therefore by no means holds, and the state of the soul after death, if it be a state of total in-

sensibility, without perception and consciousness, cannot be correctly compared to that of sleep.

But, it may be said, that to *sleep* and to *die* are terms used synonymously in Scripture, so much so that the *dead* are denominated, *those that sleep*. But I apprehend, that this phrase is generally misunderstood, and that no comparison is made in Scripture between *death* and *sleep*, but that the act of *lying down* is deemed applicable both to one and the other. Hence the verb *to lie down* signifies *metonymically* either *to sleep* or *to die*. This verb in the Old Testament is שָׁכַב, *shakàb*, which is constantly used when the phrase “to sleep with his fathers” occurs; but *shakàb* properly means *to lie down*, so that “*to sleep*,” should have been translated “*to lie down*” with his fathers. Kircher, in his Concordance to the Septuagint, accordingly remarks upon the sense of this verb, that its meaning is *to lie down* (*cubare*), and imports the motion of the body, inclining itself to a place underneath it, and that it does *not* signify *to sleep* (*dormire*), as is commonly supposed; a meaning which is expressed by the verb יָשַׁן, *jashàn*. Thus our own translators have sometimes correctly rendered it, as in Genesis xxviii. 13. “the land on which *thou liest*.” It is almost always translated in the Septuagint by

κοιμάομαι, a word of a similar meaning in Greek, and one which, consequently, is used in the same sense by the writers of the New Testament.

The proper Greek word for *to sleep* is καθεύδω, and the difference between the two expressions may be observed in Matthew xxii. 45, 46. where it is said, when Jesus “was come to his disciples he found them *lying down*, κοιμωμένους, for sorrow ; and said unto them, Why *sleep ye*,” καθεύδετε. Besides, there is a marked difference in the *tense*, when this term is applied to the dead. If the soul sleeps from death to the resurrection, and if this was the creed of the Apostles, the participle would have been used in the *present* tense, κοιμώμενοι, and not in the *past* tense, κοιμηθέντες, when speaking of those who might be supposed to be *still* sleeping. Thus in 1 Cor. xv. 18. “Then they also who *have* died (or lain down) in Christ, κοιμηθέντες, (not who *are* fallen asleep in Christ) are perished.” Again, 1 Thessalonians, “Them also who *have* died (or lain down) in Jesus, κοιμηθέντας (not who *sleep* in Jesus), will God bring with him.” Now had St. Paul entertained the same opinion as Bishop Law upon this subject, and understood the verb κοιμάομαι in the sense of *sleeping*, he would have used the participle of the *present* tense, τοὺς κοιμωμένους, *those who sleep*, as our translation renders it, and

not the participle of the *past* tense, τοὺς κοιμηθέντας, those who *have slept*, or rather died, in Christ ; for if he supposed their souls to be *still sleeping*, he could not have used the participle of the *past* tense. He seems, by adopting the word κοιμηθέντας, to have simply meant “those who *have died* in Christ,” alluding to an occurrence *actually past*, and not to one *then in progress*.

The signification which I have annexed to this word will appear by reference to John xi. 11, 12, 13, a passage often quoted for a different purpose, to be correct. Our Saviour there says, “Our friend Lazarus *has lain down*, κεκοίμηται (not as in our translation, *sleepeth*); but I go, that I may awake him, ἐξυπνίσω. Then said his disciples, Lord, if he *has lain down*, κεκοίμηται (not *if he sleep*), he shall do well. Howbeit Jesus spake of his death; but they thought that he had spoken *of the lying down*, περὶ τῆς κοιμήσεως (not *of taking of rest*) to sleep, τοῦ ὑπνους.” It is here evident, that when he used the word κοιμάομαι (or rather שכב *shakàb*, which has precisely the same meaning in Hebrew, Chaldee, and Syriac, both literally and metonymically), he meant by it a *lying down to die*; but his Apostles misconceiving its sense, thought that he meant a *lying down to sleep*, particularly as he added, “but I go that I may *awake* him.” This

mistake they could not have made, if the expression had not had two distinct significations, as applied to two different things. And when our Saviour said, "I go that I may *awake* him, ἐξπνίσω, the verb *awake* seems to be used metaphorically for to raise up, or cause to rise up, as in Psalm cviii. 2. "*Awake* ערה, psalter and harp; I will *awake* אעיר early;" where the word is taken in the first part of the verse *metaphorically*, as it is in the second part *literally*.

But, dropping the metaphor of sleep, the same writers contend that, as the soul sometimes suffers a temporary deprivation of its faculties *before* death, so may it *after* death. Thus a stunning blow will stun the soul as well as the body. It should, however, be remarked, that to *stun* is not to *destroy*. If immediate death does not succeed, the soul very soon resumes its activity; nor is it, even if a concussion of the brain follows, which is not instantly fatal, altogether inactive¹. I have somewhere

¹ It should be also observed, that a loss even of the substance of the brain is not always attended with a loss of the mental faculties. In "The Memoirs of the Philosophical Society at Manchester," there is an able paper upon this subject by Dr. Ferriar. He remarks, "The materialists deny the necessity of any thing more than the visible structure of the brain, to produce the act of thinking, in consequence of perception: but the

they cannot extinguish the soul, or, stripping it of all its faculties, cannot plunge it into a soporiferous oblivion for ages? If they can *do no more* to the man than kill the body, how is it, that they can be supposed to have the power of afflicting the soul with the extinction of the Materialist, or the insensibility of the Somnolist?

I have already adverted to our Saviour's refutation of the opinion of the Saducees, that there was no spirit, and consequently would be no resurrection, because if no unclothed spirit existed, no body would be wanting to clothe that spirit hereafter. I now pass on to the parable of the rich man, and Lazarus. Luke xvi. 19—31.

It has been a subject of controversy, whether the account here given be a *narrative* or a *parable*. Some of the early Fathers indeed considered it as a true history; and their opinion has been adopted in later times; but it is now generally deemed to be a parable¹. In the latter point of view, there-

¹ Whitby in his note on this text gives two reasons, why it must be a parable, and not a true history, the first of which he thus expresses: "Because we find this very parable in the *Gemara Babylonica*, whence it is cited by Mr. *Sheringham* in the preface to his *Joma*." Now it is singular that, in this short statement there are two errors. First, *Sheringham* did not himself cite it from the Talmud; but from the work of one *Conrad Otto*, (a converted Jew and great rogue) called *Gali Razia*, thus distinctly states: "Hæc (this and other supposed

fore, I will consider it. The two persons, which constitute the subject of this parable are not then *two known individuals* of the time, but *any two individuals similarly circumstanced*. A rich man of dissolute manners, and a poor man of a different description die. The rich man is said to be buried, and to lift up his eyes in hell, being in torments; but the poor man to be carried by angels into Abraham's bosom, or to Paradise. That hell or gehenna, the place of torment, and paradise, the place of joy and consolation, are places not only existing in imagination, but existing in reality, is, in my conception, necessary to be presumed; or else all which follows, is something worse than fictitious trifling, and the whole parable must be considered as a mere flourish of fancy, without any solid basis, and without any distinct application. A conversation is then stated to have taken place,

passages) quidem ex *Gali Razia*, una cum translatione authoris Conradi Othonis *adduxi*." *Joma* Præf. But, secondly, the whole was a forgery of *Otto*, as appears from the *Cælum Orientis Thomæ Bangi*, in which allusion is made to the quotations of Sheringham from *Otto*. "Sed ignoravit Sheringham Ottonem multa *confinxisse*, de suo addidisse, loca Talmudis interpolasse et mutasse in gratiam Christianorum, quibus seu Proselytus palpum obtrudere conabatur. Hoc testantur manuscripta ipsius *Ottonis*, quæ apud Altorfinos adhuc servari memorantur."—Page 53.

which is precisely such, I apprehend, as may be supposed to have actually taken place between persons similarly circumstanced, as those between whom it passed. Not that this conversation could have been carried on by persons seeing each other with corporeal eyes, and conversing by audible sounds, but by such unknown methods as spirits may be imagined to use in conversing with each other. We ascribe to Almighty God eyes and ears ; not that we think he possesses material organs of this description, but because we believe him endowed with faculties, of the nature of which indeed we can form no conception, but nevertheless which, we are assured, render him percipient of visible objects and audible sounds without them. The same observation also extends to the circumstance of our Saviour's allusion to the tongue of the one, and the cold water to be applied by the finger of the other person ; expressions, figurative it is true, from a defect in language, but indicative of some means capable of receiving and of giving consolation in torment, as well as expressive of a reality¹.

¹ *Locke*, in his *Essay on Human Understanding*, alludes to the communication of thought by departed spirits to each other. "In our ideas," he says, "of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection, beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinite, we

And in what does this conversation terminate ? The suffering wretch, despairing of relief, beseeches Abraham to send Lazarus to his brethren, still upon earth, in order to bear witness—of what ? Of the reality of another life immediately succeeding this, and the necessity of repentance, lest they also should come into the same place of

cannot yet have an idea of the *manner*, wherein they discover their thoughts one to another, though we must necessarily conclude, that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge, and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal signs and particular sounds, which are therefore of more general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of *immediate* communication, having no experience in ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much less, how spirits that have no bodies, can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose that they have such a power." Book II. chap. xxiii. sec. 36.

We, in our mutual intercourse with each other, use artificial language and audible sounds ; as, therefore, this is the only mode, in which we conceive from experience, that ideas can be communicated, the parable *necessarily* explains the communication of ideas from spirit to spirit in that mode, to which we ourselves are accustomed, and by which only the spiritual communication referred to can by us be at all comprehended.

torment. And in what does the reply of Abraham consist? In assuring him, that if they would not believe Moses and the prophets, neither would they be persuaded, that unrepented crime would be followed by immediate punishment after death, although informed of it by one risen from the dead. Thus the principal drift of the parable seems to be, a demonstration, that men pass immediately from this life to another either of joy or suffering, and that a timely repentance here is the only mode of preventing the infliction of misery hereafter, not when soul and body are reunited at the general resurrection, but at the very moment (as we count moments in the present life) that the soul is separated, and finds itself in a place of torment. It is plain, that the parable admits *no interval* between the rich man's death and his passage to hell; or between the death of Lazarus and his being carried into Abraham's bosom; must we not therefore conclude that it supposes the misery and happiness described to have taken place immediately after the dissolution of the body?

Besides, to whom is the parable addressed? Certainly to those, who believed in the existence of the soul separated from the body, and its instantaneous passage from this life to the next. And why are we to think, that our Saviour did

not hold the same opinion? Perhaps the true reason assignable is, because we ourselves deem that opinion erroneous, and cannot therefore imagine, that it could possibly have been entertained by our Saviour. And can we then persuade ourselves that he, who was emphatically “the way and the truth,” invented a fictitious story, not to undeceive, but for the express purpose of deceiving, those whom he taught; for the express purpose of not merely withholding from them a knowledge of their error, but of confirming them in it; an error too, with which his own disciples, as well as the people at large, were deeply tainted? Can we persuade ourselves, that he would have introduced into his parable the spirits of two persons, the one enjoying in paradise a state of happiness, the other condemned in hell to a state of torment, when he knew that no such spirits did or could exist any where? Can we think it consistent with the character of “a teacher sent from God” to conceal truth and to propagate error, to sanction a popular creed, altogether visionary, and to sanction that creed by the adoption of fable and falsehood? Surely this looks like something beyond the indulgence of harmless superstition, and something more than mere trifling with innocent prejudice.

Nor are other proofs wanting of what our Saviour taught respecting the existence of disembodied spirits, not to the people at large, but even to his own Apostles themselves, and that after his resurrection, when he could not have been himself deceived upon the subject, and when it is not conceivable, that he could wish to deceive others. Suddenly, it is said, he appeared among his Apostles, while conversing about him, who, knowing his person, became terrified, under a supposition that he was a *spirit*. But he perceiving their terror, and showing to them his hands and his feet, exclaimed, "Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself; handle me and see; for a *spirit hath not flesh and bones*, as ye see me have," Luke xxiv. 39. Here he appeals to the testimony of their senses in proof, that he was not—what? a non-entity, the mere creature of a horrified imagination? No, but that he was not a *spirit destitute of flesh and bones*, as is the nature of all spirits. He institutes a comparison between himself, evidently possessed of corporeal solidity, and a spirit, possessed of none. But how would the comparison for a moment hold, if that, to which he compared himself had no real existence whatsoever? It may, indeed, be said, as before, that the Apostles *thought* it had a real existence, and that therefore

to them the comparison was satisfactory. But would not this be to charge our Saviour with propagating superstition not only in his life-time, but even after his resurrection, by fiction, falsehood, and deceit? Besides, had our Saviour disbelieved the opinion entertained by his Apostles, instead of reasoning with them by the assumption of that very basis upon which their opinion was founded, would he not at once have confuted their error and convinced their judgments, by assuring them that he could be no spirit, because a spirit was nothing more than an imaginary being? And would he have carried on the farce of deception, for such in truth it must have been, so far, as to disprove his being a spirit, by a corporeal act, that of eating and drinking before them?

But our Saviour's creed upon this controverted point is more expressly and distinctly stated, when, in the last moments of his life, he said to one of his fellow-sufferers upon the cross, "Verily I say unto thee, *To-day* shalt thou be with me *in Paradise*," Luke xxiii. 43. It is impossible to mistake the meaning of these words, which clearly imply, that both he, and the person whom he addressed, would, in his full persuasion, be *that very day* in Paradise. Interpreters may tumble and toss themselves about as they please, but they

inserts an equivalent conjunction, as Wolzogenius remarked, and likewise the Ethiopic and Arabic versions. And it should be added, that a mode of expression precisely similar occurs in Mark xiv. 30. "And Jesus said unto him, Verily I say unto thee, *that* (ὅτι) this day, even in this night, before the cock crow twice, thou shalt deny me thrice." Yet, even in this last instance, I should remark that, although the conjunction ὅτι, *that*, occurs in the common Greek Text, it is omitted in the Cambridge manuscript, marked D. as well as in the Ethiopic version, but retained in the Syriac and Arabic versions; a circumstance which seems to favour the idea that the sense is the same in both cases, whether the conjunction be used or omitted. Nor indeed does any other interpretation of the passage but the received one appear perfectly consistent with the context. The penitent, addressing our Saviour, says, Lord, remember me, *when, after this life*, thou comest into thy kingdom. The answer given to him is, Verily I say unto thee, *even* this *very* day shalt thou be with me in paradise. This exposition is perfectly clear and plain.

Admitting, therefore, that the words in question are to be taken in their simple and unperverted signification, a curious inquirer may ask me how

such a signification can be made to accord with the sentiments of the Socinians, who deny the separate existence of the soul? I know not what better answer I can give than by quoting the gloss of *Wolzogenius* himself. After fully and accurately detailing the general creed of the Jews upon this subject, he goes on to say, “ But all this is to be received, not according to truth, but according to Jewish opinion. For if you look to truth itself, the souls of the dead *are sensible neither of joy, nor of sorrow*; yet the souls of good men rest in the hand of God, that is, they are preserved by him, that they may not be dissipated and perish (ne dissipentur ac intereant) even to the time of the resurrection of the just, when, clothed with a glorious body they will be introduced to eternal joys. But Christ did not refrain, addressing the robber as a man of the Jewish nation, from using that phraseology which was understood and used by the Jews. As Christ, therefore, here wished to speak in a manner which the robber might comprehend, so there is no doubt but that the robber understood it according to the common opinion. Thus, when he made mention of Paradise, and at once named the time, *this day*, and did so even then, when he was in the agony of death; it is certain, that the robber understood by *Paradise*

nothing else, but that state or place, whither the Jews believed the souls of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and of other pious men to be carried after death. The meaning of Christ, therefore, was this ; Not only, when I shall come into my kingdom will I be mindful of thee, but even *this day* shall thy soul be with me in the place, and in the company of the pious." Fratres Poloni, vol. vi. p. 683. In Luc. xxiii. 43.

The punctuation subterfuge is here distinctly rejected by this writer, and the true sense of the words advocated. But, nevertheless, another subterfuge is adopted, and our Saviour is represented as speaking, not according to *truth*, but in *accommodation to vulgar opinion*, asserting one thing, and mentally reserving another. Nor is what Wolzogenius conceived to be *the truth*, at all concealed ; for he expressly states that the souls of *good men* are in the hand of God, to be preserved by him from being dissipated and annihilated, until the resurrection. Not that he supposed that those souls which remain in the hand of God are still alive, but that they are preserved by him in a state of death, insensible of joy or sorrow. Thus he elsewhere says ; "*For all live unto him,*" Luke xxii. 32. That is, although they may be dead in our eyes, yet they are not dead to God, because their

souls are in his hand, and he both can and will raise them *from the dead* (à mortuis). From these words it cannot be proved, that the souls of men *live after death*. For Christ does not here undertake to demonstrate against the Sadducees, that the dead *live*, but that the dead *will rise again*, that is, will again live, or be recalled to life. But he who will necessarily be recalled to life, is truly dead during the intervening period, until he be so recalled. *To live* to God is nothing else but to become certainly and infallibly a partaker of life, because that which is appointed by Divine decree, is as certain and immutable, as if it were *now present*." Fratres Poloni, vol. vi. p. 364, 365. But the Socinian opinion upon the intermediate state is more distinctly stated by Crellius. Commenting upon 2 Cor. v. 8. he has the following remarks: "The case of those who die in the Lord is precisely the same, as if they went to the Lord Jesus in heaven *immediately*. For that time, which intervenes between their death and future life, with respect to them is as nothing. For, because that intermediate time is in no way perceived by the dead, it will seem to them, when they shall arise, just as if they had now first fallen asleep (nunc primum obdormivissent). For in those things which concern our happiness, or, what is

contrary to it, our misery. we do not take account of that which really happens (*quod revera fit*), but of that which *is perceived* by us (*quod a nobis sentitur*) ; since our whole experience of happiness and misery is dependent upon our sensations (*tota felicitatis et contrariæ miseriæ ratio in nostro sensu sit posita*), so that what is not perceived is in a manner thought by us not to exist (*non esse*). But it is manifest that the intermediate time between death and life is not perceived by the dead ; so much so indeed, that an assertion of the contrary, would be an assertion that the dead were alive, which would be an evident contradiction.

“ An example (*documentum*) of this, sleep the image of death affords ; for the deeper and more profound it is, and the more it subdues the senses, that they less notice the changes (*in dreams*), so much the shorter does it appear to those who sleep. For time is then perceived (*sentitur*), when any *movement or change* is perceived. What, therefore, we see happen in sleep, in which we nevertheless are sensible of a change in (the objects of) our imagination, and of a motion in the images of the mind, when also corporeal sense is not altogether inert (*prorsus stupet*), and some relics of sensation remain, *that* we must with much more reason transfer to death, where plainly no sensation what-

soever is left ; so that we are enabled to say, that sleep renders time shorter, death a mere nullity (*mortem nullum*). We must therefore conclude, that it is with those, who die in the Lord, equally as if (*perindè agi, ac si*) they went immediately to the Lord, and that the last moment of their mortal life is the same as the beginning of their life immortal." *Fratres Poloni*, vol. iii. p. 316.

From a perusal of these extracts, and many more might be adduced to the same effect, the reader cannot but have remarked, that the opinion entertained, and the line of argument pursued upon the subject under discussion, by the Socinian controversialists of an early period, are at least similar to those which have been since adopted by Bishop Law and his followers. I am indeed far from thinking, that the Socinian writers to whom I have alluded, are to be despised, as having been possessed neither of learning nor talent, for I am persuaded that they possessed both ; but I conceive that they prided themselves upon a mode of interpretation so remote from the correct one, and upon a style of reasoning so illogical and inconclusive, that neither can stand the test of sound criticism.

What the precise idea of the Socinians was

respecting the nature of the soul, remaining in the hand of God, without consciousness or sensibility, I have not been able to discover. They seem to have contemplated it as a substance endowed with locality, and consisting of parts liable to dispersion and annihilation. But the preservation of it by the Almighty they attributed only to the souls of good men ; what befalls those of bad men they did not say. So that after all the hypothesis appears to be incomplete. But it is certain, that they represented our Saviour, as playing with the prejudices, and fostering the superstitions of those with whom he conversed, to the last moment of his life. And can we then possibly imagine, that the infallible Founder of our holy religion would have announced to the dying penitent upon the cross the certainty of his being that very day in Paradise, when he knew that, in the Jewish sense of the expression, Paradise itself was a mere chimæra, and therefore the annunciation a direct falsehood ; sheltering himself under the evasion of a metaphysical paradox, namely, that the words *this day*, may mean not only *this*, but *any future* day whatsoever, because the person to whom they were addressed, would soon become unconscious of the lapse of time altogether. Could Christ, if

contemplated only as a mere man of common honesty and veracity, thus “keep the word of promise to his ear, and break it to his hope?”

But in truth the real point in dispute is not the decision of what might be the man’s *perception* or *non-perception* of time after his death ; but of what signification he as well as our Saviour himself affixed to the words when they were spoken. Both of them were alive at the moment, and each must have had a clear perception of time, and the relation of one portion of it to another. Neither of them could suppose that the expression *this* day, could possibly mean a day at a *distant period*, a day perhaps to arrive some thousand years afterwards. Both of them must have had distinct ideas of the lapse of time ; and of the marked difference between one specific denomination of it and another. Had not our Lord therefore intended to denote a particular part of it as contradistinguished from its other parts, instead of saying “ *This day*,” would he not have said “ *Hereafter* shalt thou be with me in Paradise ?” *This day* and *to-morrow* must be admitted to be distinct portions of time ; were you therefore about to confer a favour *the next day* upon a person, who, you knew, always slept so soundly as not to be sensible of the lapse of time during the whole

night, would you tell him, when he was preparing himself for rest, that you intended to confer the favour upon him not on *the morrow*, but on *that very day*? Would his temporary state of dormant insensibility induce you to confuse one time with another, to violate the propriety of language, and talk nonsense?

Again, it may be observed, that our Saviour promised him admission on that day into *Paradise*, but not into *Heaven*. The Jews made a marked distinction between *Paradise* and *Heaven*. By *Paradise*, they understood a place of happiness, to which the souls of good men were admitted immediately after death. Here then, as I have already remarked, our Lord must have practised, if we credit the Socinian interpretation, another deception upon the person whom he addressed. He must have deceived him in point of *place*, as well as in point of *time*. Wetstein, in his note upon this text, has collected numerous authorities upon the subject of *Paradise*, particularly from the Talmud and Jewish writers. “*Paradise*,” he remarks, “signifies a place of delight, which receives the souls of the pious dead, there to remain until they are again united to their bodies.” Then after adducing his proofs, he goes on to say; “if it be enquired what Christ meant to be understood

by the promised Paradise, the answer is, a safe and secure habitation between death and the resurrection. It must however be observed, that although almost all existing interpreters imagine Paradise and Heaven to be the same place, yet were these places distinguished from each other by the ancient Christians. Tertullian says, when we speak of Paradise, we understand a place of Divine delight for receiving the spirits of the holy, and *not Heaven*. Chrysostom remarks, that the *Manichæans* understand Heaven by the word Paradise, but not the *orthodox*," &c. Indeed, it is impossible for any one in the slightest degree conversant with Rabbinical literature to doubt for a single moment, that, according to the Jewish creed, the souls of good men dwelt in Paradise between death and the resurrection, and were not admitted into Heaven, until they were again united to their bodies at the last day.

If, therefore, we thus limit the signification of the word Paradise, the Socinian exposition must instantly fall to the ground. For as our Saviour alluded to the dying penitent's admission not into *Heaven*, but into *Paradise*, it is plain, that the expression "*this day*" could only have been intended, and must have been obviously understood, to mean that very day on which the crucifixion

place, at one and the same time, as it is of body or matter. And that spirit can so exist, when separated from the body, appears to be distinctly stated by St. Paul in the account, which he gives, of being caught up into Paradise.

“ I knew a man in Christ,” he says, meaning himself, “ (whether *in* the body, or *out of* the body I cannot tell ; God knoweth ;) how he was caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not possible for a man to utter.”— 1 Cor. xii. 3, 4.

Now, it is evident, that if the Apostle had not fully believed in the possibility of his spirit or soul being separated from his body, and taken up into Paradise, as well as being capable of receiving mental impressions, (without the instrumentality of gross material organs,) he could never have used such expressions ; he could never have conjectured, that, what he there saw and heard were things perceived by him *out of* the body. Nor did he mean to affirm, that what was revealed to him, was revealed in a vision, either when awake or when sleeping, on earth, because he distinctly alludes to his being “ *caught up* into Paradise.”

It may indeed be said, that this was but a conjecture, and one only founded upon a mere

opinion of St. Paul. It should, however, be recollected, that both the conjecture and opinion were those of an inspired Apostle, the sole object of whose ministry was the propagation of truth.

But it is not upon conjecture or opinion only, even that of an inspired Apostle, that I altogether rest in this argument; for another passage of Scripture informs us, that a disembodied spirit not only possesses locality, and the occupation of a prescribed space, but is invested with a substance capable of being surrounded with material light and splendour. When our Lord was transfigured on the Mount, we are told that Moses and Elias were seen with him, and that they both appeared *in glory*, Luke ix. 31. Now it is recorded of Moses, as I have previously remarked, that he died a natural death; consequently his appearance on this occasion must have been the appearance of a spirit, in the intermediate state between death and the resurrection. As Moses, therefore, in this state was seen by Peter, James, and John, and heard talking with Jesus upon the subject of his crucifixion, it follows, that departed spirits have the power of becoming visible to mortal eyes, and of communicating ideas by audible sounds. Whether indeed they possess no other power of com-

Left, like a withered leaf, upon the top
Of some bare oak, I stand, prepared to drop.

Once, when from slumbers roused to wake and weep,
I raised my eyelids heavy still with sleep,
A form ethereal, gleaming through the night,
Half lost in darkness, half revealed to sight,
With mien majestic onwards seemed to move,
And passing pointed to the realms above ;
Then stood and eyed me ; till at length it spoke,
And thus the long terrific silence broke :—

“ Mortal reflect ; and think, how every hour
Some victim yields to Death’s insatiate power.
See all things living, born to bliss or woe,
Sink, when he strikes, beneath the fatal blow.
Look round Creation ; his relentless hand,
Can beings, moulded from the dust, withstand ?
Nature’s mysterious wonders view ; then turn,
And from the changeful insect wisdom learn.
Crawling, a worm like thee, it meets its doom,
Like thee it dies ; but, from its self-wrought tomb,
Bursting death’s bonds, it soon begins to rise ;
Expands its new-born wings, and sports, and flies.
Shall God to insects give a second birth,
And leave thee, sprung from Heaven, to rot in earth ?
Absorbed in dust, shall man with matter lie ;
Nor seek, unclogged and free, his native sky ?
Shalt thou so long corruption’s burden bear ;
And never in angelic form appear ?
No, man’s great Shepherd spurns not thus his flock ;
Hope he conferred to bless thee, not to mock ;
To make thee view unmoved life’s stormy wave ;
And look with steady trust beyond the grave.”

The vision fled ; and left a busy train
 Of anxious thoughts to rack my tortured brain.
 Reason denies then, that the heaven-born mind
 To dark oblivion is by death consigned.
 But facts teach more than reason ; facts have rent
 The veil from truth, and challenge our assent.
 A Man is born, lives sinless, suffers, dies ;
 See from the grave that Man triumphant rise ;
 With mild reproof instruction hear him blend ;
 See him to God, from whom he came ascend.
 Fiend-like no more shall horror and despair,
 While death stands smiling by, their scourge prepare.
 Their scourge of scorpions we no longer dread ;
 He lives, who once was numbered with the dead.
 Faith hears the raging tempest howl in vain ;
 Her bark sweeps on securely o'er the main.

When I reflect on scenes now past, the hours
 Of a long life, which Heaven has strewed with flowers ;
 Can I, at length preparing to depart,
 Withhold the tribute of a grateful heart ?
 Health, wealth, domestic happiness, and fame
 Are mine, and envied titles grace my name.
 While thus my cup with blessings overflows,
 Can I forget the hand, which all bestows ?
 Of God's past mercies can I count the sum,
 And cease to trust him for the life to come ?
 Though merged in darkness, prone to err and sin,
 Still the bright ray divine man feels within.
 On him its splendour rests ; the mountain's brow
 Thus often smiles, while frowns the vale below ;
 While round its base the gathering vapours spread,
 Unclouded sunshine settles on its head.



